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This Article identifies a discrepancy between law and epistemology and 
proposes a way to fix it. Our legal system relies on decisions of multimember 
tribunals, which include juries, state and federal appellate courts, and 
supreme courts. Members of those tribunals often disagree with each other 
on matters of fact. The system settles such disagreement by applying head-
counting rules: the unanimity or supermajority requirement for jury 
verdicts and the majority rule for judges’ decisions. Under these rules, 
jurors can return an agreed-upon verdict even when their reasons for 
supporting the verdict are inconsistent with one another. Similarly, judges 
are authorized to deliver any decision so long as it is supported by a 
majority of the panel. Disagreements among judges and jurors are 
consequently ironed out instead of being accounted for as a factor that 
reduces the reliability of the final decision.  
By adopting these rules, our legal system allows jurors to convict the 
defendant when six of them believe the incriminating account provided by 
one witness, while rejecting as non-credible the testimony of another 
prosecution witness, and the remaining six jurors form a diametrically 
opposite view of the two witnesses’ credibility. Moreover, the system 
authorizes appellate courts to determine by a narrow 2-1 majority that a 
violation of the accused’s constitutional trial right was “harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” Likewise, it accords the status of an unreservedly 
binding precedent to a 5–4 decision of the United States Supreme Court that 
determines the meaning of a statutory or constitutional provision. 
These rules are fundamentally incompatible with the epistemological 
principles of rational fact-finding. The epistemology of disagreement 
maintains that when a person makes a factual finding and then realizes that 
an equally informed, competent, and honest individual—an “epistemic 
peer”—arrived at a different conclusion, based on the same information, 
                                                      
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I thank Ed Cheng, Christian Dahlman, Larry 
Laudan, Brian Leiter, Robert MacCoun, Gideon Parchomovsky, Michael Pardo, Sebastián A. Reyes, 
Ellika Sevelin, Larry Solan, and participants at the Uppsala University conference on Evidence, 
Disagreements & Rights for their excellent comments and suggestions, and Frances Kenajian (Brooklyn 
Law School Class of 2018) for her outstanding research assistance. I am also grateful to Brooklyn Law 
School for generously supporting this work through the Dean’s Summer Research stipend. Copyright © 
2018 Alex Stein. All Rights Reserved. Please do not distribute, cite or quote without author’s permission.  











she ought to scale down her level of confidence in her own opinion. A peer’s 
disagreement is evidence writ large that a person cannot rationally ignore 
or discount. Rather, it must be given weight and cause one to revisit her 
original opinion.  
This epistemological principle has far-reaching implications for the law. 
For example, a guilty verdict rendered by a jury cannot be considered 
unanimous when the underlying reasons contradict each other; a dissent by 
a single appellate judge should preclude a guilty sentence under the 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard; and a precedent laid down by a 
narrow majority of the Supreme Court should remain open to 
reconsideration.  
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Judges, jurors, and other decision-makers who make factual findings, 
identify applicable laws, ascertain the meanings of those laws, and 
determine their implications for individual cases are the lifeblood of our 
legal system. These decision-makers, however, often disagree with each 
other. The disagreements span across facts of individual cases and the 
meanings of statutes, common law doctrines, and the constitution. To 
address disagreements, the legal system has developed different decision 
rules for multimember tribunals, which include the unanimity or near-
unanimity requirement for jury verdicts and the majority vote for appellate 
courts’ and the Supreme Court’s decisions.1 
Scholars have examined those rules from an economic, political, and 
psychological perspective.2 Conspicuously absent from this list is the 
epistemology of disagreement—a rapidly developing discipline that 
analyzes the effects of a disagreement on the truth-value of the underlying 
decision.3  
This discipline focuses on two big questions. First and most importantly, 
should a person revise and possibly modify her decision after learning that 
an “epistemic peer”—a decision-maker with roughly similar information 
and decisional capabilities—disagrees with it? Relatedly, does the fact that 
                                                      
1. See infra Sections II.B. and III.B. 
2. See, e.g., J.H. Davis et al., The Empirical Study of Decision Processes in Juries: A Critical 
Review, in LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 341 
(June L. Tapp & Felice J. Levine, eds., 1977) (surveying psychological studies of jury deliberations as 
a group); Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 811–17 (1982) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court is doomed to make inconsistent decisions, as predicted by Kenneth 
Arrow’s “impossibility theorem”); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The Many as One: 
Integrity and Group Choice in Paradoxical Cases, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 249 (2004) (identifying 
structural distortions in democratic group choices); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The 
One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1993) (uncovering and 
analyzing voting paradoxes in appellate court decisions); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, 
Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82 (1986) (identifying systemic misalignment between reasons and 
decisions of multimember tribunals); Stephen Morris, The Common Prior Assumption in Economic 
Theory, 11 ECON. & PHIL. 227 (1995) (surveying economic models presupposing that actors have a 
common prior probability for making decisions and analyzing the models’ implications); Eric Posner & 
Adrian Vermeule, The Votes of Other Judges, 105 GEO. L.J. 159, 175–80 (2016) (developing theory of 
interdependent judicial voting as a rational choice that includes reciprocal updating of information). 
3. For two notable exceptions, see William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, Arguing with Friends, 
117 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 17–27), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2985032 
(drawing on epistemology of disagreement to develop a concept of “methodological friends” to whose 
opinions judges should give weight in interpreting Constitution); Youngjae Lee, Reasonable Doubt and 
Disagreement, 23 LEGAL THEORY 203 (2017) (introducing a normative assumption that ascribes equal 
weight to jurors’ divergent assessments of the probability of criminal accusations and identifying its 
effect on the aggregate probability of the defendant’s guilt). 











an equally informed and competent decision-maker disagrees with the 
person’s decision reduce the decision’s reliability?4 
As I explain in this Article, both of these questions should be answered 
affirmatively.5 When a person’s decision encompasses factual findings, the 
fact that her epistemic peer disagrees with her makes the decision less 
reliable than the decision-maker originally thought. Any such disagreement 
is evidence writ large, which the person cannot justifiably ignore, 
concerning the accuracy of the decision. From an epistemological 
perspective, a decision-maker must revise her confidence in the decision in 
a way that takes account of her peer’s disagreement.  
The revision process can proceed along one of three different paths. First 
and most straightforwardly, a decision-maker may decide to modify her 
initial decision. Alternatively, she may acknowledge that her decision is not 
as reliable as she originally thought. Finally, she may choose to disavow her 
factual claims and recast her decision into a subjective opinion, intuition, or 
value preference. From an epistemological standpoint, if the person digs her 
heels in the ground and makes neither of these decisional adjustments, her 
decision would be unjustified, if not altogether irrational.6 
To illustrate this pivotal insight, consider a case featuring two young 
associates in a law firm, Anna and Bill, who go out to lunch together and 
agree to split the check. When the check arrives, Anna and Bill glance at the 
check and continue their conversation. Ten minutes later, they discover that 
the check disappeared from the table. Asking the waiter to bring a new 
check is against social etiquette. Anna calculates that she and Bill must pay 
for the meal $26 each. She tells Bill about it, but Bill informs her that 
according to his calculation, each must pay $30. Can Anna justifiably refuse 
to modify her decision?7 
Epistemologists widely believe that Anna cannot justifiably refuse to do 
so.8 Bill and she have the same information about the cost of the meal. 
                                                      
4. See generally David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey, Introduction, in THE EPISTEMOLOGY 
OF DISAGREEMENT: NEW ESSAYS 1, 1–3 (David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey, eds., 2013) (outlining 
issues focused upon by epistemologists of disagreement). For excellent surveys of the literature, see 
Jonathan Matheson, Disagreement and Epistemic Peers, in OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE: SCHOLARLY 
RESEARCH REVIEWS (2015) [https://perma.cc/5UJY-4HDF]; David Christensen, Disagreement as 
Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy, 4 PHIL. COMPASS 756 (2009) [hereinafter Christensen, 
Disagreement as Evidence]. See also Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Group 
Disagreement: A Belief Aggregation Perspective, 195 SYNTHESE (forthcoming in 2018) (extending 
epistemological inquiry to disagreements among groups). 
5. See infra Section I.B. 
6. Id. 
7. This example is adapted from David Christensen, Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good 
News, 116 PHIL. REV. 187, 193–94 (2007) [hereinafter Christensen, Epistemology of Disagreement]. 












Presumptively, Bill’s memory and capacity to make simple algebraic 
calculations is not inferior to Anna’s. Bill’s disagreement with Anna 
consequently constitutes evidence that requires Anna to revise and modify 
her statement. Perhaps Anna should tell Bill that, since he and she were 
equally likely to miscalculate the requisite payment, each of them should 
leave $28 on the table.9 At a minimum, Anna ought to acknowledge that her 
decision is not as reliable and creditworthy as she initially thought it was.10 
The fact that a person’s epistemic peer disagrees with her is best 
conceptualized as second-order evidence.11 Second-order evidence is a 
broad category: it includes any information pertaining to the reliability and 
implications of the primary (first-order) evidence that supports the person’s 
factual findings. From this perspective, Bill’s disagreement with Anna 
constitutes second-order evidence that affects the reliability of Anna’s 
factual finding. This disagreement indicates that Anna may have 
miscalculated the payment, or, alternatively, missed something when she 
looked at the check. Hence, if Anna is interested in making an epistemically 
justified decision, she ought to account for these possibilities and update her 
initial finding accordingly. Not doing so would be a mistake. If Anna could 
justifiably ignore Bill’s calculation, then Bill, too, could justifiably do the 
same and stand steadfastly behind his original evaluation. Consequently, 
both Bill’s and Anna’s decisions would be deemed creditworthy and 
reliable, which is patently absurd. 
This epistemological insight has profound implications for the law. 
Specifically, it can help policymakers improve the rules governing non-
unanimous decisions of multimember tribunals: the jury, courts of appeals, 
state supreme courts, and the United States Supreme Court. These tribunals 
consist of epistemic peers12: judges and jurors who exercise equal 
participatory powers in the tribunal’s decision after weighing the same 
                                                      
Epistemic Significance of Disagreement, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN EPISTEMOLOGY 167 (John Hawthorne 
& Tamar Gendler eds., 2005) (arguing that whether a person is justified in believing something is solely 
a matter of her first-order evidence even when she faces a peer’s disagreement because to the extent her 
belief requires second-order validation, her peer’s contrary belief requires it too—and hence a “wash,” 
which justifies each side to disregard the dissent). 
9. This adjustment follows the “equal weight” principle for resolving peer disagreements. See 
Adam Elga, Reflection and Disagreement, 41 NOÛS 478, 484–90 (2007) (analyzing the “equal weight” 
principle). For criticism of this principle, see infra notes 43–48 and accompanying text. 
10. See Christensen, Epistemology of Disagreement, supra note 7, at 193. 
11. See Richard Feldman, Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement, 6 
EPISTEME 294, 295 (2009) [hereinafter Feldman, Evidentialism] (“[E]vidence of peer disagreement is 
…. higher-order evidence—evidence about the significance of one’s first-order evidence.”); Matheson, 
supra note 4, at 5–6. 
12. See Matheson, supra note 4, at 2–3 (defining “epistemic peers” in terms of decision-makers’ 
equality in evidential possession and ability to process evidence). 











evidence and same information about relevant legal issues. At the end of the 
proceeding, these epistemic peers consult with each other, deliberate and 
vote. They do not always vote the same way, and for that reason their 
disagreements must be properly accounted for in the final decision. 
Unfortunately, rules that presently resolve such disagreements do not 
achieve this result.13 
Consider a bank robbery case in which twelve jurors unanimously 
conclude that the defendant perpetrated the alleged crime. Of the twelve, six 
base their conclusion on the testimony of a passerby who identified the 
defendant as a robber, while rejecting as untrustworthy a similar testimony 
of the bank’s cashier. The remaining six form the opposite view: they 
believe the cashier and assign no credibility to the passerby. From an 
epistemological point of view, the dissent coming from each group of jurors 
reduces the reliability of the other jurors’ decision. This second-order 
evidence undercuts the credibility that jurors assign to each witness to a 
degree that arguably should preclude the jury from convicting the 
defendant. 
Assume now that ten jurors out of twelve unreservedly believe the 
passerby, while the remaining two jurors do not consider any of the 
witnesses credible. From an epistemological standpoint, the prosecution’s 
case now becomes stronger than before. Although the defendant can still 
rely on the two jurors’ dissent as second-order evidence, this dissent has 
weak epistemic credentials because the ten other jurors rejected it. 
Arguably, therefore, the dissent here is not strong enough to create a 
reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant robbed the bank. 
In each of these disagreement scenarios, the prevalent rules of criminal 
procedure go in the opposite direction. These rules require that jurors’ guilty 
verdicts be unanimous, but the unanimity requirement only applies to the 
bottom line.14 All that jurors need to agree about is that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he is accused beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Their reasons for arriving at this conclusion need not be the same and may 
even be mutually inconsistent.15 Under these rules, the judge presiding over 
the case in the first scenario must instruct the jurors that they should convict 
the defendant, whereas in the second scenario the judge must declare a 
mistrial.16 The fact that the prosecution’s case is epistemically weaker in the 
                                                      
13. See infra Section II.B.1. 
14. See infra Section II.B.1 (analyzing and criticizing the “bottom line” rule). 
15. See infra note 66 and sources cited therein. See also infra Section II.B.1 (discussing the 
“bottom line” rule). 












first scenario than in the second is of no consequence. Criminal procedure 
and epistemology thus sail apart from each other. This sailing apart 
diminishes the truth-value of verdicts and court decisions.  
Consider now a criminal appeal decided by a panel of three judges. Two 
judges estimate that the evidence presented at the defendant’s trial allowed 
the jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, while the remaining 
judge disagrees. From an epistemological standpoint, here too, the 
dissenting opinion makes the majority decision less reliable. Whether this 
factor should mandate reversal of the defendant’s conviction is a separate 
question and not an easy one. The answer to this question depends on the 
socially desired level of appellate scrutiny. In deciding what this level 
should be, policymakers should take the epistemology of disagreement into 
account. Failure to do so is bound to create distortions in the appellate 
system.17 
Take a defendant who appeals his conviction and shows a violation of 
his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses.18 Under extant law, the 
court of appeals may still uphold the defendant’s conviction if it determines 
that the violation was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”19 Moreover, 
this determination can be made by two appellate judges over their peer’s 
disagreement. From an epistemological perspective, two-against-one 
decisions in criminal cases are unjustified. The dissenting judge’s opinion 
that the error helped the prosecution prove the defendant’s guilt and was 
consequently harmful reduces the reliability of the majority’s decision and 
creates a reasonable doubt as to whether the error was harmless.20  
Finally, consider a disagreement among the United States Supreme 
Court Justices about the meaning of a statutory or constitutional provision. 
Five Justices out of nine decide that the provision in question has a certain 
meaning (M1). The remaining four Justices disagree: according to them, the 
provision has a different meaning (M2). From an epistemological 
standpoint, the critical question here is whether these conflicting 
understandings are about facts, as would be the case, for example, if M1 and 
M2 purported to reproduce the directive that the Constitution’s framers 
intended to lay down. If the Justices genuinely disagree about the truth of 
M1 as opposed to M2, the fact that four of them favor M2 over M1 should 
count as second-order evidence that decreases the reliability of the 
                                                      
17. See infra Section III.A. 
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (granting every criminal defendant the right “to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him”). 
19. See infra notes 153–156 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra Section III.B.  











majority’s decision. The majority, of course, should still have its way. After 
all, the Court must interpret the provision in question one way or the other, 
and a decision of five Justices is still more reliable than their four 
colleagues’ dissent. From an epistemological standpoint, however, a 5–4 
decision on a factual matter should be assigned a diminished truth-value 
relative to a unanimous or supermajority decision. For that reason, it should 
receive less deference from lower courts and should also be more open for 
reconsideration than decisions made by six or more Justices.21 
This Article calls for the incorporation of the insights of the 
epistemology of disagreement into law and provides a blueprint of how it 
should be done.  
Structurally, the Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I outline the core 
insights developed by this branch of analytical philosophy and connect them 
to law and legal theory. In Parts II, III, and IV, respectively, I identify the 
implications of those insights for jurors’ disagreements about a verdict and 
the verdict’s supporting reasons, for disagreements among appellate judges 
on whether the decision appealed against should stand, and for 
disagreements about the meanings of statutory and constitutional provisions 
that unfold in state supreme courts and at the United States Supreme Court.  
I. THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF DISAGREEMENT 
A. Disagreement as Evidence 
Should a person revise her belief when she finds out that another, equally 
informed, individual sees the facts differently?22 
This question entered the epistemological debate at the beginning of this 
century23 and stirred a controversy that is not about to end.24 Both sides to 
                                                      
21. See infra Section IV.A. 
22. See Christensen, Epistemology of Disagreement, supra note 7, at 188–89 (formulating the 
same question). 
23. For a seminal work on the subject, see Richard Feldman, Reasonable Religious 
Disagreements, in PHILOSOPHERS WITHOUT GODS: MEDITATIONS ON ATHEISM AND THE SECULAR LIFE 
194 (Louise M. Antony, ed. 2007) [hereinafter Feldman, Religious Disagreements]. 
24. See generally THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF DISAGREEMENT: NEW ESSAYS, supra note 4 
(representative collection of essays); see also Matheson, supra note 4 (analyzing epistemological 
approaches to peer disagreement and recommending treating such disagreements as evidence); 
Christensen, Disagreement as Evidence, supra note 4 (same); Kelly, supra note 8 (arguing that a peer’s 
dissent is not a reason a rational individual to update her findings of fact); Elga, supra note 9 (advocating 
the “equal weight” approach to peer disagreements); David Enoch, Not Just a Truthometer: Taking 
Oneself Seriously (But Not Too Seriously) in Cases of Peer Disagreement, 119 MIND 953 (2010) 
(surveying the epistemological debate on peer disagreement, criticizing the “equal weight” and other 












this controversy agree that a person need not revise her belief when her 
dissenter is not as well informed about the relevant facts as she is. The 
dissenter’s opinion can only be consequential when he bases it on the same 
evidence and same background information. The dissenter’s opinion also 
must be honest rather than intentionally misleading or strategic. As 
epistemologists put it, the dissenter must be the person’s epistemic peer.25  
Some epistemologists adopt a non-conciliatory, or steadfast, approach to 
peer disagreements.26 They argue that a peer’s disagreement with a person’s 
justified belief does not call for a revision of that belief. According to these 
epistemologists, a person should only care about the connection between 
her belief and the available evidence. When the evidence justifies the belief, 
the person should hold onto that belief. Because her belief is justified by the 
available evidence, the dissenter’s contradictory opinion cannot be justified 
as well.27 The person consequently will do well to ignore that opinion.  
The proponents of the steadfast approach also underscore the 
dependency of individuals’ beliefs on their reasoning faculties. Arguably, 
when a person’s belief originates from the interaction between her reasoning 
faculties and the available evidence, the dissenter’s contradictory belief—
being a product of different reasoning faculties—is immaterial.28 Each of 
those conflicting beliefs is justified on its own terms and is consequently as 
good as the other belief. Hence, granted that the person must account for the 
dissenter’s opinion as a factor that makes her belief less dependable than 
she originally thought it was, the dissenter must do the same with his own 
opinion. The dissenter’s opinion must undergo the same discounting 
because it is being disagreed with as well. This discounting will offset the 
doubt created by the dissenter and reinstate the person’s original faith in her 
own belief.29 
Other epistemologists believe that the steadfast approach is mistaken and 
endorse, instead, a conciliatory approach to peer disagreements.30 Under the 
conciliatory approach, a peer’s disagreement constitutes evidence that the 
                                                      
25. See Matheson, supra note 4, at 2–3. See also Christensen, Disagreement as Evidence, supra 
note 4, at 756–57 (defining “epistemic peer” as one’s equal “in terms of exposure to the evidence, 
intelligence, freedom from bias, etc.”). 
26. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 8 (recommending the steadfast approach). 
27. See, e.g., Ralph Wedgwood, The Moral Evil Demons, in DISAGREEMENT 216, 228 (Richard 
Feldman & Ted A. Warfield, eds., 2010). 
28. Id. 
29. See Kelly, supra note 8, at 177–79 (explaining the “wash” principle). 
30. See generally Elga, supra note 9; Feldman, Evidentialism, supra note 11; Feldman, Religious 
Disagreements, supra note 23; Christensen, Disagreement as Evidence, supra note 4; Christensen, 
Epistemology of Disagreement, supra note 7; Matheson, supra note 4. 











person cannot rationally ignore.31 Conceptually, such disagreements are 
best understood as second-order evidence that reduces the reliability of the 
person’s belief.32 This second-order evidence indicates that the person’s 
belief may have some flaws that she failed to identify. The person therefore 
cannot simply brush the dissent aside. Doing so would amount to an 
epistemically irrational disregard of relevant evidence.33 
The steadfast approach is suitable for decision-makers who justifiably 
believe that they know the true facts.34 Consider a decision-maker who 
holds a justified belief in the occurrence of event E. This belief is justified 
for the following reason: evidence supporting it is counterfactually sensitive 
to E in the sense that such evidence never shows up when E does not occur 
and is always present in E’s occurrence. Evidence that passes this rigorous 
test, identified as “sensitivity,”35 does more than merely justify the decision-
maker’s belief: it also makes the decision-maker’s belief likely correct.36  
Assume now that the decision-maker encounters a dissenter who tells her 
that, in his opinion, E actually did not occur. The dissenter gives the 
decision-maker no information besides this opinion. Because the dissenter 
is a human being and is not omniscient, his opinion fails the sensitivity test. 
This failure is predicated on the fact that the dissenter occasionally makes 
mistakes and it is therefore entirely possible for him to express an opinion 
about an event’s non-occurrence in a case in which the event actually does 
occur. Hence, although the dissenter’s opinion still constitutes evidence that 
runs against the decision-maker’s belief, the decision-maker can safely 
ignore it because her evidence passed the sensitivity test and the dissenter’s 
opinion failed it.  
The upshot of this discussion is straightforward. Justified beliefs in true 
facts are self-sufficient: they require no headcounts or other second-order 
confirmations.37 Holders of such categorical beliefs can rationally stick to 
their guns until they are presented with new evidence that falsifies their 
                                                      
31. See supra note 30 and sources cited therein. 
32. See supra note 11 and sources cited therein. 
33. Id. There is also a middle-ground view that justifies switching between the steadfast and 
conciliatory approaches, as circumstances require. See Enoch, supra note 24, at 965. Ultimately, Enoch 
seems to support a rebuttable presumption in favor of conciliation. See id. at 993 (“[T]hat someone you 
(justifiably) take to be your peer disagrees with you about p should usually reduce your confidence in 
p.” (emphasis added)). 
34. Cf. Enoch, supra note 24, at 994 (arguing that a person’s rational choice between the steadfast 
and conciliatory approaches depends, inter alia, on “other things [the person justifiably] believe[s], on 
other evidence [she has,] [and] on the epistemic methods [she is] justified in employing . . .”). 
35. See TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON, KNOWLEDGE AND ITS LIMITS 147–50 (2000). 
36. Id. 












beliefs. The mere fact that another individual disagrees with a person’s 
justified categorical belief is of no consequence.  
Move now to non-categorical, or defeasible, beliefs, also identifiable as 
probabilistic. Consider a decision-maker who forms a belief in the likely, 
but still not certain, occurrence of event E. In forming that belief, the 
decision-maker relies on evidence indicating that E probably has occurred. 
This indication is uncertain because similar evidence was also present, 
although not as frequently, in circumstances different from E. The decision-
maker encounters a dissenter who estimates that E was unlikely to occur 
because—according to her experience or intuition—circumstances in which 
similar evidence was present, but E nonetheless did not occur, are not rare. 
The two parties may now try to compare their experiences in the hope to 
reach an agreement. Reaching such an agreement, however, would often be 
difficult, if not altogether impossible, because people’s experiences and 
intuitions are not—and need not be—identical. Such incompatibilities of 
opinion on matters of fact are inevitable and widespread. This pluralism 
often proves to be constructive in that it prompts people to be self-critical 
and periodically revise their opinions and beliefs. Yet, it does not indicate 
that the parties to a disagreement are both right. In fact, the exact opposite 
is the case: one of those parties, if not both of them, is mistaken. Each party 
should therefore acknowledge the defeasibility of her own decision.  
For decisions based on defeasible beliefs in the underlying facts, second-
order confirmations and disconfirmations matter a lot. If so, the number of 
well-informed individuals opining on whether the underlying factual 
proposition, or belief, is likely to be true is also of consequence. As the old 
saying goes, “Two heads are better than one.”38  
The implications of this epistemological insight are straightforward. 
People seldom make any decisions that rest upon justified categorical 
beliefs in the truth of the underlying facts.39 Beliefs underlying people’s 
decisions are overwhelmingly probabilistic and defeasible.40 They 
incorporate experience and intuitions by which the decision-makers 
interpret evidence.41 Any such belief is consequently weakened by the 
                                                      
38. JOHN HEYWOOD, DIALOGUE OF PROVERBS I 9 (Julian Sharman ed., 1874).  
39. See, e.g., ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 34–36 (2005) (explaining why 
certainty in factfinding is not within reach). 
40. See, e.g., Peter Tillers, Introduction, 66 B.U. L. REV. 381, 381 (1986) (“Practically every 
lawyer, judge, and law teacher believes that some degree of uncertainty infects nearly all inferences 
drawn from evidence.”). 
41. See, e.g., Steven Lubet, The Forgotten Trial of Wyatt Earp, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 4 (2001) 
(“This is an inevitable feature of historical fact finding—the use of one’s experience and intuitions to 
deduce what must have happened.”) (emphasis omitted); Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of 
Fact, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1040 n.69 (1956) (“[A]ll fact finding must rest to some degree on 











existence of an equally informed dissenter. A person who faces such a 
dissenter therefore must reduce her level of confidence in the opinion she 
holds about relevant facts and become aware of the possibility that it is 
mistaken. The person will then have to evaluate the implications of that 
prospect for her position. Specifically, she must compare the scenario in 
which she stands behind her opinion, but it turns out to be a mistake, against 
the scenario in which she accepts the dissenter’s opinion, but the dissenter’s 
opinion proves to be erroneous. Consequences of these two possible errors 
may differ in their severity, and the person should take it into account as 
well. The person should make a decision that brings about the least harmful 
consequences. 
Under this decisional framework, harmful consequences of errors are the 
only factor the person should consider. The person should not venture into 
estimating the expected harm by combining those consequences with her 
self-assessed probability of making a wrong decision. This probability is 
part and parcel of the person’s disagreement with her epistemic peer. The 
person also cannot rationally assume that her peer is more error prone than 
she is.42 
As an alternative to scaling down a person’s confidence in her factual 
finding, some epistemologists have proposed to integrate a peer’s 
disagreement into that finding.43 To operationalize this proposal, they 
introduced the “equal weight” principle.44 This principle stems from the 
premise that a person has no rational basis for asserting epistemic 
superiority over her epistemic peer.45 Under this premise, when a person’s 
epistemic peer disagrees with her opinion, the person must give the peer’s 
opinion the same weight that she gives her own opinion.46 The person and 
her peer will then have an equal (fifty percent) probability of getting the 
facts right.47 
                                                      
intuition.”); JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 165–85 (1949) (underscoring the central role of 
intuitions in courts’ decisions about facts). 
42. See Elga, supra note 9, at 486 (“When you learn of your friend’s opposing judgment, you 
should think that the two of you are equally likely to be correct. For suppose not—suppose it were 
reasonable for you to be, say, 70% confident that you are correct. Then you would have gotten some 
evidence that you are a better judge than your friend, since you would have gotten some evidence that 
you judged this race correctly, while she misjudged it. But that is absurd.”).  
43. This proposal is known as “strong Conciliationism.” See Christensen, Disagreement as 
Evidence, supra note 4, at 759. 
44. See Elga, supra note 9, at 484–90. 
45. Id. at 486–87. 
46. Id. 












The “equal weight” principle, however, might produce distortions.48 Of 
two individuals who make conflicting factual findings, one must be right 
and another must be wrong. Alternatively, both individuals may be wrong. 
Under any of these circumstances, giving epistemic credit to each of the 
conflicting findings is anomalous.  
To see why, assume that the two individuals are similarly trained 
surgeons who disagree on how to operate on a patient. Assume further that 
one of the surgeons is right and another is completely off target. Having 
these surgeons proceed on the “equal weight” principle will bring about bad 
consequences. The “equal weight” principle would recommend that each 
surgeon suppresses her opinion and delivers the treatment favored by her 
dissenter to every second patient. If the surgeons follow that 
recommendation, half of the total population of patients would receive 
wrong treatment. Allowing each surgeon to treat patients according to her 
own judgment would therefore be a much better policy. This policy would 
allow one of the two surgeons to deliver proper treatment to all of her 
patients. The mistaken surgeon might still mistreat all of his patients, so that 
half of the total population of patients—the same number as under the 
“equal weight” principle—will suffer. This worst-case scenario, however, 
is unlikely to materialize. A streak of successful surgeries carried out by the 
surgeon who happens to be right will create new information that will bring 
more patients to that surgeon. Conversely, a series of fiascos wrought by the 
mistaken surgeon will motivate his prospective patients to find another 
doctor.  
Decision-makers will therefore do well to treat their peer’s disagreement 
as second-order, rather than first-order, evidence. Facing such 
disagreement, they can still hold onto their opinion, but they must reduce 
their confidence in it and act accordingly. The surgeons in my example 
should follow this principle. Each of them should scale down the level of 
confidence in the treatment that he or she recommends. This update will 
make the treatment’s probability of success unclear and not as dependable 
                                                      
48. This principle is akin to the statistical principle of indifference that determines the 
implications of the unavailable information for people’s assessments of probability. Cf. Elga, supra note 
9, at 487 (“When you learn of your friend’s opposing judgment, you should think that the two of you 
are equally likely to be correct . . . . If it were reasonable for you to give your own evaluation extra 
weight—if it were reasonable to be more than 50% confident that you are right—then you would have 
gotten some evidence that you are a better evaluator than your friend.”). The indifference principle 
postulates that unavailable information is not slanted in any direction. Under this simplifying 
assumption, two (or more) mutually exclusive scenarios should be deemed equally probable unless there 
is evidence that makes one of those scenarios more probable than the alternative(s). See L. JONATHAN 
COHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF INDUCTION AND PROBABILITY 43–44 (1989) 
(explaining the principle of indifference). 











as before. Whether the surgeon should still go ahead with the treatment is a 
separate question and a complicated one as well. The answer to this question 
depends on what would happen to the patient if the treatment is withheld. If 
withholding the treatment is bad for the patient, the surgeon should go ahead 
and treat the patient as she deems right. Conversely, when not implementing 
the treatment exposes the patient to a relatively small risk of harm, the 
surgeon’s reduced confidence in the treatment might be a good reason for 
her to stay put.  
B. Implications for Law and Legal Theory 
Our legal system has three fundamental characteristics that make the 
epistemology of disagreement critical for understanding and improving its 
functioning. These characteristics are: the importance of truth, the reliance 
on defeasible beliefs under conditions of uncertainty, and the employment 
of multimember tribunals on both trial and appellate levels.  
Begin with the most intuitive of those characteristics: the importance of 
truth.49 Our legal system deeply cares about convicting and punishing only 
those defendants who committed the alleged crimes as a matter of fact. The 
system also makes a sustained effort at imposing liability for torts, breaches 
of contract, and other civil wrongs only upon people who actually 
committed those misdeeds. The system is equally concerned with the 
accuracy of appellate courts’ determinations as to whether the trial judge 
erred in admitting or refusing to admit evidence, in instructing the jury about 
the law, or in ruling on other procedural matters, and whether that mistake 
actually affected the outcome of the case. By the same token, in cases 
involving application of a statute or constitutional provision, the system 
often cares about ascertaining the provision’s true meaning.50 Courts 
consequently need to make factual determinations as to what the provision 
actually says and what its drafters intended to communicate.51 
Within each of these decision-making frameworks, getting to the truth is 
easier said than done. For the most part, facts that courts need for resolving 
                                                      
49. See generally Louis Kaplow, Information and the Aim of Adjudication: Truth or 
Consequences?, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1303 (2015) (juxtaposing truth against instrumental goals of the legal 
system). 
50. See Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 859–60, 862–66 (1992) 
(describing inquiries into the meanings of legal rules as epistemological and recommending setting up 
burdens of proof and other evidentiary requirements for establishing those meanings in the courts of 
law). 
51. Lawson, supra note 50, at 874–77; see also Ryan D. Doerfler, High-Stakes Interpretation, 
116 MICH. L. REV. 523 (arguing that ascertaining the meaning of a statutory text in high-stakes cases is 












controversies remain unrevealed private information.52 Furthermore, 
because one party to a proceeding stands to lose the case following the 
discovery of true facts, this party will make a serious—and oftentimes 
successful—effort at suppressing or distorting the truth.53 Worse yet, in the 
majority of the cases, courts must determine the relevant facts on the basis 
of incomplete evidence and within severe time constraints.54 For these 
reasons and in order to economize on the cost of adjudicative proceedings, 
judges and juries have no choice but to make defeasible—rather than 
categorical—decisions on matters of fact. They have to base their factual 
determinations on probabilities, as opposed to certainties.55 These 
probabilities incorporate subjective inputs. Both judges and jurors 
determine them by analyzing evidence through the lens of their experiences 
and intuitions.56 
Our legal system also has established multimember tribunals for making 
adjudicative decisions. These tribunals include the jury, appellate courts, 
and, of course, the Supreme Court of the United States. The primary (albeit 
not only57) goal of their creation is rectitude of decision58: the system’s need 
to make adjudicative findings of both fact and law as accurately as 
possible.59 To achieve this goal, the system places the power of making 
decisions about people’s rights, duties, and liabilities and about the 
                                                      
52. See, e.g., Robert H. Gertner & Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement Escrows, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 
87, 89–90 (1995) (observing that private information is prevalent in civil litigation). 
53. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Distortionary Effect of Evidence on Primary 
Behavior, 124 HARV. L. REV. 518, 521 & n.6 (2010) (observing that “[a] person interested in prevailing 
in court will tend to act in a way that maximizes the probability of achieving that result” and citing 
sources). See generally Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the 
Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997). 
54. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for Determining Truth in 
Judicial Trials, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 229 (1966) (observing that courts must rely on incomplete 
information in making decisions). 
55. Id. at 241 (“Adjudication is a practical enterprise serving a variety of functions. Among the 
goals—in addition to truth finding—. . . are economizing of resources.”). See also Tillers, supra note 
40, at 381 (noting consensus among scholars and practitioners that adjudicative factfinding deals with 
probabilities rather than certainties). 
56. See supra note 41 and sources cited therein. 
57. The jury system also promotes democracy and civic involvement. See, e.g., Heather K. 
Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1112–17 (2005). 
58. The term “rectitude of decision” originates from Jeremy Bentham. See 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, 
RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 34 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1995) (1827). 
59. See, e.g., Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (“The basic purpose 
of a trial is the determination of truth”); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) (“[T]he 
central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence”). 
The same also holds true of questions of law. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225 (1986) 
(“[P]ropositions of law are true if they figure in or follow from the principles of justice, fairness, and 
procedural due process that provide the best constructive interpretation of the community’s legal 
practice.”). 











meanings of statutes and constitutions in the hands of equally informed and 
(more or less) equally competent decision-makers: judges and jurors. These 
decision-makers function as epistemic peers. 
These characteristics call for adoption of the conciliatory approach to 
disagreements among members of these tribunals. When members of a legal 
tribunal disagree on matters of fact, their disagreement should be recognized 
as second-order evidence that makes the underlying factual finding less 
likely to be accurate and consequently less dependable. Failure to adopt this 
approach is bound to create distortions in the tribunals’ decisions.  
My proceeding discussion explains and illustrates this pivotal insight in 
relation to three core mechanisms of our legal system: the jury trial, the 
appellate review process, and the formation of precedent in matters of 
statutory and constitutional interpretation. 
II. DISAGREEMENTS WITHIN THE JURY 
Laws regulating jurors’ voting focus exclusively on the final verdict and 
the agreement that must support that verdict. Under these laws, jury verdicts 
about a criminal defendant’s guilt or a civil defendant’s liability need to be 
supported by the requisite number of impartial jurors.60 Criminal verdicts 
must be unanimous except in Louisiana and Oregon, where ten jurors out of 
twelve can convict the accused.61 For the most part, civil verdicts can 
nowadays be delivered by a supermajority of jurors: typically, by nine jurors 
out of twelve.62 Federal law and a number of states that still require 
                                                      
60. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87–89 (1986) (reaffirming criminal defendants’ 
constitutional right to be tried by impartial and racially unbiased jurors). 
61. See LA. CONST. art. I, §17(A) (authorizing ten jurors out of twelve to return a guilty verdict, 
but findings of guilt in capital crimes must be unanimous); OR. CONST. art. I, § 11; Johnson v. Louisiana, 
406 U.S. 356 (1972) (similar holding for Louisiana’s previous rule, which allowed nine jurors out of 
twelve to return a guilty verdict in a noncapital case; Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) 
(upholding constitutionality of Oregon law that allows ten jurors out of twelve to convict the defendant). 
For criticism of these rules and a call for a universal unanimity requirement for criminal verdicts, see 
Aliza B. Kaplan & Amy Saack, Overturning Apodaca v. Oregon Should Be Easy: Nonunanimous Jury 
Verdicts in Criminal Cases Undermine the Credibility of Our Justice System, 95 OR. L. REV. 1 (2016) 
(arguing that non-unanimous guilty verdicts dilute the requirement that guilt be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt); Kyle R. Satterfield, Comment, Circumventing Apodaca: An Equal Protection 
Challenge to Nonunanimous Jury Verdicts in Louisiana, 90 TUL. L. REV. 693 (2016) (using historical 
evidence to show that non-unanimous guilty verdicts in Louisiana violate equal protection). 
62. See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Revisiting the Unanimity Requirement: The Behavior of 
the Non-Unanimous Civil Jury, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 201, 203 (2006) (“The unanimity standard . . . has 
significantly eroded for verdicts in civil cases. Federal juries must be unanimous, but only eighteen states 
require unanimity and another three accept a non-unanimous verdict after six hours of deliberation.”). 
See also, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“[I]n a civil cause three-fourths of the jury may render a verdict”); 
Ark. R. Civ. P. 48 (“Where as many as nine out of twelve jurors in a civil case agree upon a verdict, the 












unanimity authorize civil verdicts to be delivered by panels of six jurors.63 
To deliver a verdict, the requisite number of jurors must coalesce around 
the elements of the alleged crime or civil cause of action.64 When consensus 
cannot be reached and the jurors cannot resolve the deadlock, the judge must 
pronounce a mistrial, which will often, but not always, be followed by a new 
trial.65 What constitutes an “element of the crime” for purposes of the 
                                                      
63. See COLO. R. CIV. P. 48 (“The jury shall consist of six persons, unless the parties agree to a 
smaller number, not less than three.”); Developments in the Law, The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 
1408, 1467 (1997) (“[I]n seeking to streamline civil trials, federal judges have allowed civil juries to 
shrink from twelve to six members.”). Cf. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“In civil causes the jury shall consist 
of 12 persons or a lesser number agreed on by the parties in open court.”); DEL. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 48 
(“The parties may stipulate that the jury shall consist of any number less than 12 or that a verdict or a 
finding of a stated majority of the jurors shall be taken as the verdict or finding of the jury.”). 
64. See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 636–44 (1991) (specifying and applying the “elements” 
requirements for purposes of jury unanimity); Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817–20 (1999) 
(same). 
65. See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1984) (“It has been established for 
160 years . . . that a failure of the jury to agree on a verdict was an instance of ‘manifest necessity’ which 
permitted a trial judge to terminate the first trial and retry the defendant, because ‘the ends of public 
justice would otherwise be defeated.’” (citing United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 580 (1824))). See 
also, e.g., People v. Halvorsen, 165 P.3d 512, 544 (Cal. 2007) (“Jury deadlock constitutes necessity for 
declaration of a mistrial and permits retrial of the defendant.”); People v. Aceval, 764 N.W.2d 285 
(Mich. 2009) (holding that retrial after a mistrial is not barred by double jeopardy if the mistrial was the 
result of manifest necessity, such as a hung jury). 











required agreement among jurors has not been completely resolved 
doctrinally66 and is still a part of an ongoing scholarly debate.67 
From an epistemological standpoint, this outcome majoritarianism is 
fundamentally misguided. Outcome majoritarianism often works well as a 
democratic mechanism for maximizing the fulfillment of individuals’ 
preferences.68 Whether a criminal defendant did or did not commit the 
                                                      
66. See, e.g., State v. Bratthauer, 354 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 1984) (jurors must be unanimous 
on whether the defendant committed the alleged crime, but not as to the mode of the crime’s 
commission); State v. Nguyen, 989 A.2d 712, 715 (Me. 2010) (“We have already decided that the Maine 
Constitution is satisfied by a unanimous finding of guilt even if the jury is not unanimous as to which of 
the multiple possible means the defendant employed in committing the crime.”); Crispino v. State, 7 
A.3d 1092, 1102 (Md. 2010) (“While the jurors have to be unanimous with regard to each element of an 
offense, they need not be unanimous with regard to the means used by the defendant in committing the 
act.”); State v. Abejide, 879 N.W.2d 684, 692 (Neb. 2016) (“We have stated that where a single offense 
may be committed in a number of different ways and there is evidence to support each of the ways, the 
jury need only be unanimous in its conclusion that the defendant violated the law by committing the 
act.” (citing State v. Galindo, 774 N.W.2d 190 (Neb. 2009))); Christopherson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 384 
P.3d 1098, 1106–07 (N.M. Ct. App. 2016) (“In the criminal arena, where alternative theories of guilt are 
put forth under a single charge, jury unanimity is required only as to the verdict, not to any particular 
theory of guilt.”); State v. Boots, 780 P.2d 725, 728–31 (Or. 1989) (juror unanimity required as to 
elements); State v. Sparks, 83 P.3d 304, 314–17 (Or. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 893 (2004) 
(upholding a unanimous jury verdict that found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder 
notwithstanding the jurors’ possible disagreement about the crime’s location because location was a 
“factual detail” rather than “element” of the crime). Cf. People v. Russo, 25 P.3d 641, 645 (Cal. 2001) 
(“Th[e] requirement of unanimity as to the criminal act is intended to eliminate the danger that the 
defendant will be convicted even though there is no single offense which all the jurors agree the 
defendant committed. . . . [It] is designed in part to prevent the jury from amalgamating evidence of 
multiple offenses, no one of which has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to conclude 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant must have done something sufficient to convict on one 
count.” (citations omitted)); Roelker v. People, 804 P.2d 1336, 1340 (Colo. 1991) (“If . . . there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the jurors may disagree on the acts the defendant committed, either the 
prosecution must elect specific acts or the jury must be given a modified unanimity instruction. The jury 
must be instructed that in order to convict the defendant, they must either unanimously agree that the 
defendant committed the same act or acts or that the defendant committed all of the acts described by 
the victim and included within the time period charged. The election of an act at trial, or the alternative 
unanimity instruction, is necessary to assure that some jurors do not convict on one offense and others 
on a separate offense.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)); State v. Bailey, 551 A.2d 1206, 1212 
(Conn. 1988) (“In essence, the unanimity requirement . . . requires the jury to agree on the factual basis 
of the offense. The rationale underlying the requirement is that a jury cannot be deemed to be unanimous 
if it applies inconsistent factual conclusions to alternative theories of criminal liability.”).  
67. See, e.g., Brian M. Morris, Something upon Which We Can All Agree: Requiring a 
Unanimous Jury Verdict in Criminal Cases, 62 MONT. L. REV. 1 (2001) (supporting the “elements” 
approach to unanimity while advocating for measures that will eliminate jurors’ confusion); Peter 
Westen & Eric Ow, Reaching Agreement on When Jurors Must Agree, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 153 
(2007) (arguing that jurors can return a guilty verdict only when all of them agree about the specific or 
alternative means used by the defendant in perpetrating the alleged crime); Brian Bah, Note, Jury 
Unanimity and the Problem with Specificity: Trying to Understand what Jurors Must Agree about by 
Examining the Problem of Prosecuting Child Molesters, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1203 (2013) (proposing to 
improve the “elements” approach to jurors’ unanimity in child molestation cases). 
68. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: 












alleged crime, however, is a matter of empirical truth rather than preferences 
or democracy. The fact that many people form a preference that a particular 
individual be identified and punished as a criminal does not make that 
individual deserving of conviction and punishment. By the same token, 
albeit less intuitively, the mere fact that twelve jurors come to believe that 
the defendant committed the alleged crime does not make that belief 
epistemically justified or even consequential.69 Such collective beliefs are 
epistemically consequential (and potentially justified as well) only when 
they rely on reasons grounded in the evidence that the jurors heard. This 
evidence, in turn, must identify the defendant as a perpetrator of the crime 
beyond any reasonable doubt.70 
From an epistemological standpoint, this standard of proof requires that 
the requisite number of jurors (twelve out of twelve in a regular criminal 
case) coalesce not only around elements of the crime, but also around the 
reasons identifying the factual presence of these elements. When jurors do 
not coalesce around these evidence-based reasons while still agreeing about 
elements of the crime, they do not just agree, but also disagree, and their 
disagreement makes their conclusion that the defendant committed the 
crime epistemically unsound. 
Take two groups of jurors, A and B, who come to the conclusion that the 
defendant committed a certain crime. Group A comes to that conclusion for 
a different reason than Group B while rejecting Group B’s reason. Group B, 
for its part, rejects the reason adopted by Group A. Under such 
circumstances, Group A’s disagreement with Group B’s reason constitutes 
second-order evidence that reduces the reliability of that reason. By the 
same token, Group A’s reason becomes less reliable too because of Group 
B’s disagreement with that reason. Under such circumstances, finding the 
                                                      
under which majority-vote decisions benefit the group as a whole).  
69. Arguments taking this direction allude to the Condorcet Jury Theorem which associates the 
number of convergent beliefs with the beliefs’ probability of being true. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, 
Conjunction and Aggregation, 99 MICH. L. REV. 723, 734–36 (2001). This theorem, however, only 
works when each individual juror votes independently and is more likely than not to find the truth. Under 
these assumptions, the addition of each juror to the panel increases the probability that the jurors’ 
collective decision (delivered unanimously or by a majority vote) will correspond to the true facts. Id. 
at 734–35. See also Paul H. Edelman, On Legal Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 31 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 327, 328 (2002). From an epistemological standpoint, postulating that each juror has a 
greater than fifty percent chance of finding the truth amounts to bootstrapping. This postulation proceeds 
from the premise that each juror has a greater than fifty percent chance of correctly processing the 
evidence, which presupposes the prevalence of justified true beliefs among jurors. Convenient as it may 
be for designing a predictive model of collective decision-making, this presupposition takes for granted 
the very thing that epistemology subjects to scrutiny. 
70. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (holding that constitutional due process requires 
that criminal defendants’ guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt). 











defendant guilty may well satisfy the preferences of both groups, but 
criminal trials are not about satisfying jurors’ preferences. Their goal is to 
get as close as possible to the true facts in order to convict the guilty and 
acquit the innocent. Assuming, as we should, that the jury unanimity 
requirement aims at enhancing the factual accuracy of guilty verdicts, 
jurors’ coalescence around the conclusion that the defendant committed the 
alleged crime will only provide the needed enhancement when all of them 
also agree about the reasons supporting that conclusion. Absent such 
comprehensive agreement, the defendant’s guilt will not be established 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  
This insight has important implications for both theory and doctrine, and 
I now turn to analyze these implications. 
A. Theory  
From an epistemological standpoint, the jury mechanism aims at 
enhancing the accuracy of verdicts, criminal and civil. Those verdicts are 
defeasible. They always reflect the probability, rather than certainty, of the 
facts underlying the relevant rights, duties, and liabilities. The requisite 
probability for criminal convictions is “beyond a reasonable doubt”71 and 
for civil liability, “preponderance”72 or “clear and convincing evidence.”73 
Factfinders evaluate evidence against these probability thresholds by using 
their experience and intuitions.74 
This framework brings into play second-order evidence that indicates 
how dependable the factfinders’ decision is. This second-order evidence 
ought to include agreements and disagreements among jurors, who function 
as epistemic peers. A juror’s agreement with another juror’s factual finding 
makes that finding more dependable and, consequently, safer to rely upon 
than before. Conversely, when one juror disagrees with another’s finding, 
the finding’s dependability is diminished. Any legal system that uses this 
mechanism must decide how many jurors should sit on a panel in civil and 
criminal trials, how to select those jurors to fend off bias and secure 
impartiality, and how many jurors need to agree that the evidence upon 
                                                      
71. STEIN, supra note 39, at 199 n.98 (explaining the “beyond a reasonable doubt” requirement 
for convictions). 
72. Id. at 219–20 (explaining the “preponderance” standard for findings in civil cases). 
73. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 3.3, at 112 (5th ed. 
2012) (explaining the “clear and convincing” proof standard that controls proceedings that might deny 
a person certain civil rights). 












which they base their decision about criminal or civil liability meets the 
predetermined probability threshold. 
Critically, the legal system must also determine how to account for 
jurors’ disagreements in matters of fact. Consider policymakers who 
estimate that guilty verdicts are only safe when supported by a unanimous 
decision of twelve jurors. Consistent with this estimation, the policymakers 
cannot allow jurors to return a guilty verdict while disagreeing about the 
supporting reasons. The policymakers must therefore put in place an 
additional rule that will clarify the unanimity requirement for convictions. 
This rule should require that all jurors agree about the reasons for 
determining that the defendant committed the alleged crime. 
Under this rule, jurors will be authorized to base guilty verdicts on any 
admissible evidence and factual narrative that they deem proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Prior to delivering a guilty verdict, however, jurors would 
have to state not only their agreements, but also their disagreements about 
evidence and facts. Importantly, jurors would also be authorized to make 
disjunctive factual findings. For example, they would be able to return a 
guilty verdict after finding that one of several witnesses who testified 
against the defendant was telling the truth. There would be no need for them 
to single out that witness, so long as their disjunctive finding is unanimous 
and they have no reasonable doubts about it. Moreover, jurors would also 
be authorized to convict a criminal defendant if they find him guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt under every factually possible scenario. There would be 
no need for them to identify one specific scenario that actually occurred in 
the case at bar, so long as they reach a unanimous verdict for every 
alternative scenario. 
The Supreme Court’s old decision, Andersen v. United States,75 
illustrates the principles I just explained. This decision focused on an 
indictment alleging that the defendant, a seaman, shot and wounded another 
seaman and had him thrown into the ocean. The prosecution also alleged 
that the victim died from his wound or, alternatively, drowned and died in 
the ocean. Based on these facts and after reviewing the evidence presented 
at the trial, the Supreme Court decided that the jury could properly find the 
defendant guilty of murder. Specifically, the Court ruled that the jury could 
base its guilty verdict upon two alternative scenarios in which the victim 
dies either from the shotgun wound or from being drowned.76 Under either 
scenario, the Court explained, the defendant was as guilty of murdering the 
victim, and, for that reason, it was not necessary for the jury to determine 
                                                      
75. Andersen v. United States, 170 U.S. 481 (1898). 
76. Id. at 500–01. 











which scenario actually transpired in reality.77 All that the prosecution had 
to do was to convince every juror on the panel that the two scenarios were 
possible and jointly exhaustive.78 
Assume now that one of the jurors in the Andersen case comes to believe 
that the victim could not have died from his wound. The juror bases this 
belief on the testimony of an eyewitness who described the victim’s wound 
as superficial. Another eyewitness testified that the victim’s wound was 
fatal, but the juror did not believe that witness. Consistent with these 
assessments of the witnesses’ credibility and after considering all other 
evidence, the juror concludes that the victim was thrown into the ocean on 
the defendant’s command and died. This conclusion precludes unanimity 
among the jurors. The jurors now cannot unanimously decide that the 
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant murdered 
the victim. The scenario in which the victim dies from the gunshot wound 
is faced by a dissenter and consequently remains unproven. Ostensibly, the 
jurors are now unanimously endorsing the drowning scenario. This, 
however, is not the case because eleven jurors out of twelve have indicated 
that they are uncertain about this scenario (by affirming that the “death from 
the gunshot wound” scenario was possible, too). This indication must be 
counted as second-order evidence against the drowning scenario. The 
twelve jurors could unanimously recognize this scenario as an alternative to 
the series of events in which the victim dies from the gunshot wound. As a 
standalone possibility, however, the drowning scenario was epistemically 
unsafe. This scenario could only be safe to base the guilty verdict upon if 
all jurors, rather than just one, were to make an affirmative finding that the 
victim died from drowning in the ocean and not from the gunshot wound. If 
the jurors cannot make this finding unanimously, they should find the 
defendant guilty of attempted murder, as opposed to murder. 
B. Doctrine 
Extant law regulates jurors’ disagreements by setting up two rules. One 
of those rules can be called “bottom line” and is also widely known as the 
Schad-Richardson doctrine.79 Another rule is known as a “hung jury” or a 
                                                      
77. Id. at 500 (“[T]he indictment charged the transaction as continuous . . . two lethal means were 
employed cooperatively by the accused to accomplish his murderous intent, and whether the vital spark 
had fled before the riddled body struck the water, or lingered until extinguished by the waves, was 
immaterial.”). 
78. See id. at 501 (“The mate was shot, and his body immediately thrown overboard, and there 
was no doubt that, if not then dead, the sea completed what the pistol had begun.”).  












mistrial rule.80 Under the bottom-line rule, jurors can deliver a guilty verdict 
in a criminal case simply by agreeing that the defendant committed the 
alleged crime.81 In all jurisdictions except Louisiana and Oregon, this 
agreement must be unanimous.82 In Louisiana and Oregon, the agreement 
must be reached by ten or more jurors out of twelve.83 Critically, jurors do 
not need to coalesce around the reasons for reaching agreement. All they 
need to agree about is that the elements of the alleged crime are present in 
the defendant’s conduct and its consequences.84 Each individual juror is free 
to disagree with her peers about the reasons for that conclusion. She may 
believe a witness that her peers find untrustworthy and disbelieve a witness 
that her peers consider credible. Every individual juror may also base her 
bottom-line decision on a factual narrative that differs from the facts that 
her peers on the jury panel believe to be true. Similar rules apply to decisions 
made by a civil jury as well.85 
Under the hung jury rule, when jurors are deadlocked in the sense that 
they fail to reach unanimity or the requisite majority in deciding the case, 
the judge must declare a mistrial.86 Following that declaration, the 
prosecutor in a criminal case or the plaintiff in a civil case usually will be 
given an opportunity to re-litigate the case.87 The prosecutor (or the civil 
plaintiff) will then have to make a decision about the desirability of starting 
over and litigating the case from square one. Oftentimes, but of course not 
always, she will decide to drop the case. 
Each of these rules violates epistemological justification principles. In 
what follows, I identify these violations and explain their consequences. 
Before doing so, I must acknowledge that the legal system has goals and 
concerns that lie outside the domain of epistemology. For that reason, a legal 
rule cannot be automatically condemned as irrational just because it runs 
afoul of an epistemological principle. Yet, failure to comply with 
epistemological principles widens the gap between the resulting decisions 
and the truth. The gap is the price that a legal system pays for any such 
failure. Sometimes, this price is worth paying. For example, epistemological 
principles are often too costly to implement. Under such circumstances, the 
legal system will do well to economize on the factual accuracy of court 
                                                      
80. See infra Section II.B.2. 
81. See supra note 66 and sources cited therein. 
82. See supra note 61 and sources cited therein. 
83. See supra note 61 and sources cited therein. 
84. See supra note 66 and sources cited therein. 
85. See supra note 66 and sources cited therein. 
86. See supra note 65 and sources cited therein. 
87. See supra note 65 and sources cited therein. 











decisions. Epistemological principles may also lead to factual revelations 
that are harmful to individuals or society at large. When such harm is 
excessive, the legal system will do well to avoid it. In the proceeding 
paragraphs, however, I demonstrate that applying epistemological 
principles to jurors’ disagreements is neither costly nor otherwise harmful. 
Suppressing these principles will consequently distort the factfinding 
process while producing no offsetting benefits. 
1. The “Bottom Line” Rule 
In the landmark decision Schad v. Arizona,88 the United States Supreme 
Court upheld the defendant’s first-degree murder conviction under an 
Arizona statute that defined first-degree murder as “willful, deliberate [or] 
premeditated . . . or which is committed . . . in the perpetration of, or attempt 
to perpetrate, . . . robbery.”89 The defendant was found driving an expensive 
new vehicle that belonged to the victim, who was found dead from 
strangulation at a distant location. Initially, the defendant claimed that he 
drove the vehicle with the victim’s permission, but subsequently changed 
this story by admitting that he stole the vehicle while insisting that “he was 
a thief, not a murderer.”90 The prosecution, for its part, argued for either of 
the following two scenarios: (1) the defendant killed the victim in cold 
blood; or (2) the defendant killed the victim without premeditation while 
robbing him of his car and other belongings.91 The trial judge instructed the 
jury that each of those scenarios (if proven beyond a reasonable doubt) 
makes the defendant guilty of first-degree murder and that “[a]ll 12 of you 
must agree on a verdict.”92 This instruction subsequently received 
affirmation from the Arizona Supreme Court in a decision explaining that:  
In Arizona, first degree murder is only one crime regardless whether 
it occurs as a premeditated murder or a felony murder. Although a 
defendant is entitled to a unanimous jury verdict on whether the 
criminal act charged has been committed, the defendant is not entitled 
to a unanimous verdict on the precise manner in which the act was 
committed.93 
                                                      
88. 501 U.S. 624 (1991). 
89. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-452 (1973), superseded by Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1105 
(2009). 
90. Schad, 501 U.S. at 628–29. 
91. Id. at 629. 
92. Id. at 624.  












The United States Supreme Court ruled that this decision and Mr. Schad’s 
trial involved no violations of constitutional due process or the right to a 
jury trial.94 This ruling was based on the Court’s analysis of the elements of 
the crime.95 The Court reasoned that states can properly define first-degree 
murder in terms of two alternatives—premeditated killing or felony 
murder—and then invite jurors to choose either of those alternatives as a 
sufficient ground for convicting the accused.96 Under this statutory 
framework, it explained, the two alternative elements are nothing but 
alternative means of committing first-degree murder.97 According to the 
Court, guilty verdicts ought to be based on the jurors’ unanimity as to 
whether the defendant committed the alleged crime, not on how he did it.98 
Allowing each individual juror to base her or his decision to convict the 
defendant on any alternative element of the alleged crime consequently 
“[does] not fall beyond the constitutional bounds of fundamental fairness 
and rationality.”99 
From an epistemological standpoint, this decision is profoundly 
misguided. Definitions of criminal offenses are not self-executing. To apply 
them properly, jurors must ascertain the empirical facts that reveal what the 
defendant actually did. These facts are a property of the real world. They do 
not depend on the words of criminal statutes and how those statutes 
formulate elements of the crime. Moving from one definition of first-degree 
murder to another consequently cannot change those facts and the facts’ 
probabilities. When jurors’ unanimity is necessary for establishing the facts 
incriminating the defendant, finding out what the jurors agree and disagree 
about is critical. Facts about which jurors disagree are not proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  
Assume that six jurors out of twelve decided that Mr. Schad killed the 
victim with premeditation and the remaining six jurors determined that he 
killed the victim without premeditation while robbing him of his car and 
other belongings. According to the Supreme Court, this combination of the 
jurors’ findings warrants the defendant’s conviction of first-degree 
murder.100 Allowing jurors to make such decisions, however, is 
                                                      
Encinas, 647 P.2d 624, 627 (Ariz. 1982)), aff’d sub nom. Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991)). 
94. Schad, 501 U.S. at 645. 
95. Id. at 631–32. 
96. Id. at 632–37. 
97. Id. at 636. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 645. 
100. Id. at 632 (“We see no reason . . . why the rule that the jury need not agree as to mere means 
of satisfying the actus reus element of an offense should not apply equally to alternative means of 
satisfying the element of mens rea.”). 











epistemically wrong because jurors here do not simply agree about the 
defendant’s guilt. They agree about the defendant’s guilt as a bottom line 
while disagreeing about the reasons for determining that the defendant 
committed the alleged crime.101 Six jurors out of twelve disagree with their 
peers’ estimation that the defendant committed felony murder. The other six 
jurors refuse to join the decision that the prosecution proved its 
premeditated murder accusation beyond a reasonable doubt. This 
disagreement reduces the reliability of both decisions and creates a 
reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt. Ignoring this second-order 
evidence will not make those decisions more reliable than they are. Justice 
White, who dissented from the Court’s decision together with three other 
justices, was therefore right when he wrote: 
[A] verdict that simply pronounces a defendant “guilty of first-degree 
murder” provides no clues as to whether the jury agrees that the three 
elements of premeditated murder or the two elements of felony 
murder have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, it is 
entirely possible that half of the jury believed the defendant was 
guilty of premeditated murder and not guilty of felony 
murder/robbery, while half believed exactly the reverse. To put the 
matter another way, the plurality affirms this conviction without 
knowing that even a single element of either of the ways for proving 
first-degree murder, except the fact of a killing, has been found by a 
majority of the jury, let alone found unanimously by the jury as 
required by Arizona law.102 
From an epistemological perspective, the key issue that arises in the Schad 
type of case is not how to aggregate the jurors’ divergent opinions into a 
single verdict.103 Rather, the issue here is what jurors are disagreeing about 
                                                      
101. Cf. Westen & Ow, supra note 67, at 187–92. Professor Westen and Eric Ow argue that jurors 
should be permitted to achieve aggregated unanimity. According to them, a guilty verdict is unanimous 
when each individual juror “believes beyond a reasonable doubt that if the defendant did not commit the 
offense by one of the alleged means, the defendant must have committed it by another alleged means.” 
Id. at 191. For this approach to work, however, jurors must reach an additional unanimous decision: all 
of them must agree that the specific means by which the defendant committed the offense is of no 
consequence. This decision would confirm that jurors do not disagree about any material fact. When a 
single juror estimates that the defendant committed the offense by one of the alleged means, but not by 
another, the jury will fail to reach unanimity. See also infra note 103. 
102. Schad, 501 U.S. at 655 (White, J., dissenting). 
103. Cf. Michael S. Pardo, Group Agency and Legal Proof; Or, Why the Jury Is an “It”, 56 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1793, 1847–49 (2015). Based on collective epistemology, id. at 1821–24, Professor 
Pardo criticizes Justice White for failing to recognize the disjunctive proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Id. at 1847. Specifically, he claims that the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard is satisfied when all 












and whether this disagreement creates a reasonable doubt about the 
defendant’s guilt. For that reason, there is only one way for a jury to deliver 
a disjunctive guilty verdict with regard to a crime that has alternative 
elements: all jurors have to agree under the “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard that the defendant committed the crime in either of the two (or 
more) alternative ways, and they also must be unanimous in their reasons 
for reaching that conclusion. 
The Supreme Court has made the same epistemological mistake in 
Richardson v. United States.104 This time around, the Court’s mistake 
benefited the defendant at the prosecution’s expense. The defendant was 
found guilty of running “a continuing criminal enterprise” in violation of 
federal criminal law.105 To establish that the defendant was guilty of that 
offense, the prosecution had to prove that he violated federal drug laws 
while acting in concert with five or more people managed or organized by 
him, where “such violation [was] a part of a continuing series of 
violations.”106 The trial court proceeded from the premise that the threshold 
number that makes drug kingpin activities “a series” was three.107 Based on 
that premise and consistent with the Schad precedent, the court instructed 
jurors that they “do not . . . have to agree as to the particular three or more 
federal narcotics offenses committed by the defendant.”108 This instruction 
was upheld by the Seventh Circuit,109 but the Supreme Court decided that it 
was wrong and that “unanimity in respect to each individual violation [was] 
necessary.”110  
The Court based its decision on the structural difference between the 
federal “continuing criminal enterprise” offense and crimes such as 
Arizona’s first-degree murder.111 According to the Court, premeditated 
killing and felony murder are merely the means by which a person can 
                                                      
premeditated; and if not, then the defendant killed the victim while committing robbery. Id. at 1848. 
Moreover, he also argues that “if half the jury concluded that the disjunctive explanation was plausible 
and the other half concluded felony murder (but not intentional murder) was plausible, then the jurors 
agree on first degree murder.” Id. This argument abandons the critical requirement that jurors agree on 
the reasons for their collective verdict. Disjunctive verdicts that hide a possible disagreement among the 
jurors are not really unanimous. Nor do they satisfy the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, given the 
potential or actual presence of second-order evidence—the jurors’ disagreement—that reduces the 
disjunctive findings’ reliability. 
104. 526 U.S. 813 (1999). 
105. Id. at 815–16; 21 U. S. C. § 848(a) (2012). 
106. Richardson, 526 U.S. at 816; 21 U. S. C. § 848(c) (2012). 
107. Richardson, 526 U.S. at 816. 
108. Id. 
109. United States v. Richardson, 130 F. 3d 765, 779 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 526 U.S. 813 
(1999), remanded to 195 F.3d 316 (7th Cir. 1999). 
110. Richardson, 526 U.S. at 816. 
111. Id. at 817. 











commit first-degree murder under Arizona statute.112 Such means or “brute 
facts” that make up an element of the crime do not require unanimity among 
jurors.113 The unanimity requirement only applies to elements of the 
crime.114 For example, jurors can split over whether the defendant 
committed robbery by threatening his victim with a gun, as opposed to 
knife, or vice versa.115 In the Court’s view, “a disagreement about means—
would not matter as long as all 12 jurors unanimously concluded that the 
Government had proved the necessary related element, namely, that the 
defendant had threatened force.”116 With elements of the crime, the Court 
explained, things are different because jurors are required to reach 
unanimity about elements as the verdict’s bottom line.117 
With these general observations in mind, the Court went on to determine 
that each drug violation is an element of the requisite series of violations 
about which all jurors have to agree in order to return a guilty verdict.118 
The Court reasoned that the words “violates” and “violations” “have a legal 
ring,”119 that there is a need to mitigate the breadth of the “continuing 
criminal enterprise” statute along with the resulting risk of unfairness to the 
accused,120 and that “permitting a jury to avoid discussion of the specific 
factual details of each violation[] will cover up wide disagreement among 
the jurors about just what the defendant did, or did not, do.”121 
This reasoning is unpersuasive. The concepts of “premeditation” and 
“felony murder,” which the Court categorized as merely means or brute 
facts in the context of the Schad decision,122 have a legal ring to them. 
Felony murder is also widely considered an overbroad offense calling for 
interpretive adjustments that will protect defendants against unfairness.123 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, covering up any disagreement 
among jurors about their individual reasons for returning a guilty verdict is 
a serious epistemological error. There is no difference between jurors’ 
disagreements about elements of the crime and their divergent opinions 
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117. Id. at 818. 
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119. Id. at 818. 
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122. Schad, 501 U.S. at 636. 
123. See generally Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 59 (2004) (carrying out historical and doctrinal analysis of felony murder and arguing that 












about “garden variety” facts and evidence. The reason is simple: any fact 
and piece of evidence goes into the jurors’ decision about elements of the 
crime. When it cannot go into that decision, it must be irrelevant124 and 
consequently inadmissible;125 and so jurors can never form a genuine 
disagreement about it. Hence, when jurors genuinely disagree about 
relevant and hence consequential facts—no matter what they are—this 
disagreement makes the jurors non-unanimous and should therefore 
preclude them from returning a guilty verdict. From an epistemological 
viewpoint, any such disagreement reduces the reliability of factual findings 
against the defendant.  
The Court’s decision denied the government an opportunity to establish 
that the defendant orchestrated three or more unspecified drug operations. 
When twelve jurors unanimously agree that this accusation is proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, they should find the defendant guilty as charged. 
Importantly, however, if one juror out of twelve decides that the defendant 
orchestrated three specific drug operations, while playing no part in other 
drug activities that the prosecution attributes to his gang, this decision would 
create a disagreement among the jurors and make them non-unanimous. 
2. The “Hung Jury” Rule 
Consider now the hung jury rule under which the judge must declare a 
mistrial when jurors fail to unanimously agree about the verdict (or form the 
majority needed to deliver a verdict, when they are allowed to do so).126 
From an epistemological point of view, this rule is inadequate as well. Take 
a genuine disagreement among twelve jurors who decide a criminal case 
under the unanimity rule. Eleven jurors come to the conclusion that the 
defendant committed the alleged crime. One juror disagrees with that 
conclusion because she believes the defendant’s alibi witness. The dissent 
should count as second-order evidence that reduces the reliability of the 
majority’s decision and creates a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s 
guilt. Under any such circumstances, if the jurors’ collective decision were 
to be determined by epistemic criteria, there would be no deadlock and no 
mistrial. Rather, the jurors would have to return a “not guilty” verdict.127  
                                                      
124. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining relevancy). 
125. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 402 (providing that irrelevant evidence is not admissible). 
126. See supra note 65 and sources cited therein. 
127. In practice, this problem is mitigated by the “leniency asymmetry effect” identified by Robert 
J. MacCoun & Norbert L. Kerr, Asymmetric Influence in Mock Jury Deliberation: Jurors’ Bias for 
Leniency, 54 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 21 (1988) (showing that pro-acquittal coalitions of jurors tend to 
dominate pro-conviction factions). See also Norbert L. Kerr & Robert J. MacCoun, Is The Leniency 
Asymmetry Really Dead? Misinterpreting Asymmetry Effects in Criminal Jury Deliberation, 15 GROUP 











Under our legal system, however, whether the jury is deadlocked or not 
is determined by outcome majoritarianism rather than epistemology. 
Outcome majoritarianism is a technical rule. Under this rule, when jurors 
coalesce around their final decision unanimously or with a requisite 
majority, they are not deadlocked, and when they fail to reach the required 
consensus for whatever reason, they are deadlocked.128 Gainsayers receive 
no epistemic credit that could go into the jurors’ collective decision and 
resolve the deadlock one way or another. Instead of giving them that credit, 
the law treats them as mere obstructionists. 
Gainsayers sometimes deserve no epistemic credit. They may act as 
obstructionists by dissenting from the majority’s decision for reasons 
unrelated to evidence and facts.129 When they do so in a criminal case, the 
judge has no choice other than to declare a mistrial and the government 
should be entitled to put the defendant on trial again for the same crime. But 
a juror also may dissent from the majority’s decision for reasons that are 
epistemic rather than strategic. When that happens, the juror’s dissent 
should be accounted for in the final verdict. Under the unanimity rule, the 
jury would then have no choice but to acquit the accused, whereas under 
Louisiana’s and Oregon’s supermajority rule it would still return a guilty 
verdict. Mistrials triggered by jurors’ epistemic dissent are therefore 
unjustified. When followed by a new trial, they erode the defendant’s 
constitutional protection against double jeopardy.130 To prevent this erosion, 
the law should require trial judges to investigate the reasons behind the 
juror’s decision-blocking dissent. The judge should declare a mistrial only 
when she estimates that those reasons are most likely to be strategic rather 
than epistemic. When the judge finds out that those reasons are epistemic, 




                                                      
PROCESS. INTERGR. RELA. 585 (2012) (updating studies identifying the “leniency asymmetry effect” 
and arguing that without leniency asymmetry the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard will be eroded). 
128. See supra notes 65, 66 and sources cited therein. 
129. For example, jurors may intentionally flout the law which they find objectionable—a 
phenomenon known as “jury nullification.” See generally Jonathan Bressler, Reconstruction and the 
Transformation of Jury Nullification, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1133 (2011) (examining the constitutionality 
of prohibiting jury nullification); Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1601 (2001) 
(analyzing jury nullification in civil trials). 
130. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be 












III. DISAGREEMENTS IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS 
A. Theory 
Appellate review carried out by state and federal courts is aimed at 
reducing the total social cost of mistaken trial court decisions while 
economizing on the costs of appeals.131 Courts of appeals promote these 
twin goals by correcting only those decisions of trial courts that are clearly 
erroneous.132 In tune with that policy, they confine their investigations to 
the trial record and search only for errors that are big and consequential, 
while paying no attention to more minor oversights of the trial judge.133 
Errors that courts of appeals investigate include misapplication of the law 
and abuse of discretion in the trial management, admission of evidence, and 
jury instructions.134 After finding any such error, a court will evaluate its 
effect on the final verdict and determine whether the error was material or 
not.135 If the error was material, the court of appeals will modify the verdict 
or quash it and remand the case to the court below (with or without 
instructions).136 If the error is immaterial to the outcome and hence 
harmless, the court will dismiss the appeal.137  
As a consequence, courts of appeals often find themselves in a position 
not to investigate an error allegation when they estimate that the alleged 
error was harmless anyway. Conversely, by focusing only upon serious 
mistakes, courts of appeals often put themselves in a position not to 
investigate the error’s effect on the final verdict. Instead of carrying out such 
costly investigations, they simply assume that the error was harmful and 
quash the verdict.138 This decision-making strategy has two advantages: it 
reduces the cost of appellate procedures and minimizes the incidence of 
error in appellate courts’ rulings. 
Appellate courts make all these decisions by employing panels of three 
or more judges. These panels follow the simple majority rule. For example, 
when two appellate judges out of three decide to dismiss the appeal and the 
                                                      
131. For an economic analysis of appeals, see Steven Shavell, On the Design of the Appeals 
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remaining judge votes to allow it, the appeal will be dismissed. Conversely, 
when only one judge out of three believes that the appeal should be 
dismissed, but two other judges decide to grant the appellate relief, the relief 
will be granted. Relevant for purposes of the present discussion, the 
majority rule does not discriminate between judges’ holdings on matters of 
law and factual determinations. For example, when two appellate judges out 
of three come to believe that the trial court’s error had no distortionary effect 
on the final verdict as a matter of fact, this belief will doom the appeal. The 
dissenting judge’s estimation that the error is harmful will be of no 
consequence.  
From an epistemological standpoint, this rule is far from obvious because 
it suppresses epistemically valuable information. The dissenting judge’s 
opinion that the error was, in fact, harmful constitutes second-order 
evidence that has epistemic value. This evidence indicates that the 
majority’s decision is not as reliable as it purports to be. Whether this 
evidence should affect the appeal’s disposition is a wholly separate question 
that depends on the social cost of not correcting the verdict appealed against, 
should it turn out to be erroneous, and on the cost of vacating the verdict if 
it should stand. Critically, those costs are not static: they vary from one 
category of cases to another. For example, the cost of erroneously affirming 
a verdict obligating the defendant to pay the plaintiff $100,000 for a breach 
of contract is roughly the same as the cost of erroneously vacating such a 
verdict.139 Dismissing a rightful appeal against criminal conviction followed 
by a long prison sentence, however, is not the same as mistakenly granting 
a meritless appeal. The social cost of denying post-conviction remedy to a 
deserving appellant in a criminal case would virtually always be greater than 
the cost incurred by vacating a criminal verdict that should stand.140 
Our appellate system therefore ought to adjust the majority rule in a way 
that accounts for the differences between risks of error in appellate courts’ 
decisions. The system, however, universally fails to do this. By giving no 
epistemic credit to disagreements among appellate judges, it treats all 
appellate errors as the same. Appellate errors, however, are not always 
equal: some of them are costlier than others. Application of the majority 
rule is consequently bound to impose unnecessary social costs.  
                                                      
139. See, e.g., Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991) (recognizing equal allocation of 
the risk of error between plaintiffs and defendants as a baseline principle of civil procedure). 
140. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 367 n.158 (1972) (quoting Justice Douglas’s 
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free society that every individual . . . have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of 













The Eleventh Circuit has recently delivered an important decision about 
the implications of a violation of a criminal defendant’s right to be 
represented by an attorney.141 This decision was preceded by an en banc 
hearing of the defendant’s appeal.142 The defendant petitioned to overturn 
the jury verdict that found him guilty of five sex-related crimes involving 
minors.143 This verdict was based, inter alia, on the testimony of a 
government witness who told the jury that the defendant possessed child 
pornography.144 The witness testified before and after lunchtime on the 
same day.145 The defendant’s attorney returned late from the lunch break to 
discover that the trial judge allowed the witness to testify in his absence for 
seven minutes.146 During these seven minutes, the witness gave answers to 
eighteen questions of the prosecuting attorney.147 These answers gave the 
jury information incriminating the defendant, but they accounted for less 
than one percent of the total testimony.148 Moreover, “the little testimony 
that counsel had missed was repeated in even more detail by the same 
witness after counsel returned to the courtroom.”149  
The trial judge’s decision to carry on with the trial in the defense 
attorney’s absence was unquestionably a violation of the defendant’s right 
to counsel.150 And because that right is guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment,151 the guilty verdict that the jury returned at the end of the trial 
was presumptively unconstitutional and invalid.152 To salvage this verdict, 
the government had to convince the court of appeals that the constitutional 
violation was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” as well as not 
“structural.”153 The Supreme Court’s precedent categorizes constitutional 
violation (or error) as “structural” when it “undermines the basic guarantee 
of fairness, resulting in a strong potential for prejudice and immeasurable 
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effects.”154 Such per se violations include erroneous denial of counsel at a 
“critical stage” of the trial.155 On the other hand, when the violation’s effect 
is readily assessable, the court must carry out the harmless-error analysis to 
determine under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard whether the guilty 
verdict should stand.156 
Five appellate judges out of eight decided that the government made the 
requisite showing,157 while the remaining three judges opined that it did 
not.158 According to the majority, the eighteen questions and answers that 
the defendant’s attorney missed had no independent evidentiary 
significance.159 Rather, they were part of the same account that the witness 
gave to the jury and reiterated in the presence of the defendant’s attorney.160 
Moreover, these questions and answers pointed to facts that the government 
independently proved by adducing overwhelming inculpatory evidence in 
the attorney’s presence.161 These questions and answers consequently did 
not belong to a “critical stage of the trial”162—a categorization that would 
have mandated the reversal of the guilty verdict.163 Furthermore, the trial 
judge’s erroneous decision to allow those questions and answers was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.164  
The majority acknowledged that this decision was nothing but an 
exercise of their best judgment.165 Specifically, Chief Judge Carnes wrote:  
It would be nice if there were a software program into which a trial 
record could be scanned, an error could be input into the program, 
and the result would pop up on screen as: “prejudicial” or “harmless.” 
That is not, however, the nature of the enterprise. Prejudice inquiries 
require the exercise of a court’s best judgment. All prejudice or 
harmlessness determinations require some measure of estimation or 
of what the Supreme Court in Sears described as permissible 
“speculation.” Every work day all across the country courts decide 
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cases by determining, to the best of their abilities, whether something 
that defense counsel did, or did not do, prejudiced or harmed the 
defendant by adversely affecting the result of the trial.166 
Two judges disagreed with the majority’s factual determinations.167 They 
estimated that the consequences of the trial judge’s mistake were 
“immeasurable and likely extremely prejudicial.”168 They found that those 
consequences “[defied] assessment absent impermissible speculation”169 
because they were “necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate.”170 As 
one of the dissenters wrote:  
We cannot know what defense counsel would have said or done had 
he been present the first time around; nor can we ascertain with any 
degree of certainty how the prosecution’s approach or the witness’s 
answers might have changed if defense counsel had been present and 
able to participate in the process.171  
Worse yet, there was also no way to know “what the jurors must have 
thought when they saw the district court commence proceedings without 
defense counsel present.”172 For these reasons, the two dissenters 
categorized the error as “structural” within the meaning of the Supreme 
Court’s Cronic precedent.173 They also estimated that the error was not 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in any event.174 Consistent with these 
decisions, they expressed the view that the error required reversal and a new, 
constitutionally-compliant, proceeding.175 
Judge Jill Pryor wrote a separate dissent in which she disagreed with her 
colleagues’ understanding of the Cronic precedent.176 According to her, 
Cronic laid down a per se rule that mandates reversal of the defendant’s 
conviction upon finding a violation of his constitutional right to counsel 
“while the jury heard testimony that directly incriminated him.”177 A “case-
by-case inquiry into prejudice,” she wrote, “simply is inappropriate where 
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structural error exists.”178 She also estimated, however, that the defendant 
in fact suffered no prejudice because “[his] counsel’s absence was very 
brief, particularly with reference to the trial as a whole; we know from the 
transcript what transpired in counsel’s absence and when he returned; and 
the testimony counsel missed largely was repeated upon his return.”179 
Hence, had Judge Pryor not interpreted Cronic as a categorical rule, she 
would have joined the court’s decision to dismiss the appeal.180 
This case vividly illustrates the consequences of ignoring the 
epistemology of disagreement. Five judges out of seven181 coalesced around 
two factual findings. They held that the questioning of the government’s 
witness carried out in the absence of the defendant’s attorney was beyond a 
reasonable doubt (1) not critical to the trial182 and (2) harmless in the sense 
that it did not influence the jurors’ guilty verdict and consequently caused 
no prejudice to the defendant.183 The remaining two judges firmly stood 
behind altogether different findings.184 According to them, the 
unconstitutional questioning of the witness (1) might have been critical to 
the trial185 and in any event, (2) might have been instrumental to the 
defendant’s conviction and hence prejudicial.186 The majority rule used by 
our appeals system ironed this disagreement out by according superiority to 
the majority’s decision while giving no epistemic credit to the dissent. 
From an epistemological point of view, brushing aside the dissenting 
opinion of two judges, instead of giving it the epistemic credit it deserves, 
is anomalous. This opinion constituted second-order evidence that reduced 
the reliability of the majority’s decision. This decision was inherently 
probabilistic and not foolproof, as Chief Judge Carnes openly 
acknowledged on behalf of the court.187 By making this decision even less 
reliable than it purported to be, the dissent has raised serious, and hence 
reasonable, doubts about its factual correctness. The majority’s decision 
therefore could not be factually correct beyond a reasonable doubt. As a 
corollary, it could not justifiably verify the truth of any factual proposition 
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beyond a reasonable doubt. Five judges out of seven therefore could not 
justifiably determine that the constitutional error in the Roy case was non-
structural and harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Factual findings that are 
not demonstrably true can only satisfy the “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard when they are unanimous.  
Admittedly, our appellate practices cannot be guided by epistemological 
considerations alone and should respond to pragmatic concerns as well. 
Under certain conditions, therefore, policymakers might consider adopting 
a supermajority rule as a plausible, as well as practically necessary, 
substitute for the unanimity requirement. For example, when ten appellate 
judges out of eleven agree that a violation of the defendant’s right to counsel 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, dismissing the appeal over the 
dissent of a single judge may be justified on pragmatic grounds and also 
would not be deeply objectionable from an epistemological point of view.  
This, however, is not the case when one third of the judges disagree with 
the majority. A recent Fourth Circuit decision, United States v. Garcia–
Lagunas,188 is a case in point. In this case, the court was asked to review a 
drug trafficking conviction of a defendant of Mexican origin.189 Drugs 
seized from the defendant’s trailer included only a small baggie of crack 
cocaine.190 The prosecution nonetheless accused him of selling 500 
kilograms of cocaine and called four witnesses to testify.191 The defendant 
claimed that he was a drug user, but not a drug dealer,192 and drew the jury’s 
attention to his very modest living.193 In rebuttal, the prosecution called a 
police detective to testify that “Hispanic drug traffickers [have a] very 
modest living [because] they send the majority if not all of the proceeds 
back to their native countries.”194 The trial judge admitted this testimony 
over the defendant’s objection195 and the trial continued.196 At the end of the 
trial, the jury found the defendant guilty as charged and the judge sentenced 
him to 188 months in jail.197 The defendant’s subsequent appeal against the 
conviction centered on the judge’s ruling that admitted the stereotypical 
generalization about “Hispanic drug traffickers” into evidence.198 
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The prosecution conceded that this ruling was a constitutional error199 
and the court of appeals decided to proceed from that baseline premise.200 
That premise was legally correct as well because “[a]ppeals to racial, ethnic, 
or religious prejudice during the course of a trial violate a defendant’s Fifth 
Amendment right to a fair trial.”201 The court of appeals, however, decided 
that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt202 and affirmed the 
defendant’s conviction.203 This decision was supported by two judges out of 
three,204 who relied on evidence that appeared overwhelming.205 This 
evidence included phone records that corroborated the testimony of three 
out of four witnesses who testified that the defendant sold them 500 
kilograms of cocaine.206 Consistent with drug traffickers’ behavior, these 
records showed “an extraordinary volume of phone calls in a compressed 
period of time.”207 The prosecution had also proven that the defendant was 
in possession of two scales, large and small, a bulletproof vest, and a 
revolver208 and brought a witness who testified that these items, too, 
represent the modus operandi of drug traffickers.209 Based on this evidence, 
the majority of the court concluded that a rational jury would have found 
the defendant guilty as charged even if they did not hear the offensive 
stereotype about Hispanic drug dealers.210 
According to the dissenting judge, the government failed to establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt “that its clearly unconstitutional use of a blatant 
ethnic generalization did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.”211 The dissent 
relied on a simple fact: the government offered no admissible evidence to 
rebut the defendant’s innocence theory that drew the jury’s attention to his 
poor living.212 From this fact, the dissenting judge inferred that the 
government did need its inadmissible evidence to explain to the jury why a 
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person who sells drugs for hundreds of thousands of dollars elected to live 
like a pauper.213 
The court’s dismissal of the defendant’s appeal runs against the 
epistemology of disagreement. Here too, the dissenting judge’s opinion 
undercut the reliability of the majority’s decision. This opinion may not 
have deserved the same epistemic credit as the two judges’ decision, but it 
ought to have been given some epistemic credit, big enough to raise a 
reasonable doubt and overturn the defendant’s conviction instead of 
dismissing his appeal.214 
IV. DISAGREEMENTS ABOUT MEANINGS OF STATUTES AND 
CONSTITUTION 
A. Theory 
1. Analytical Background 
When a judge writes in her decision that the meaning of a statutory or 
constitutional provision is X, this statement can be factual, normative, or 
autocratic. A judge’s statement will qualify as factual when it relies on the 
available empirical information about X, and only on that information. Apart 
from the provision’s text, this information will usually include the relevant 
linguistic usage and conventions, the history of the provision’s enactment 
or ratification, and the goals that its drafters wanted to achieve. When a 
judge chooses X because she believes that it is intrinsically valuable or 
brings about socially desirable consequences, her statement will be 
normative. Finally, when a judge decides that the provision means X 
because she wants it to mean X, her statement will be autocratic. 
Any statement that purports to make sense must expressly or implicitly 
assert its own correctness or validity.215 The statement consequently must 
rely on the speaker’s criteria for correctness or validity.216 When a judge 
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makes a factual statement about the meaning of a statutory or constitutional 
provision, the criteria for verifying that statement will include the 
provision’s language and other empirically verifiable information. The 
judge’s statement will consequently be as correct as its supporting empirical 
information. When a judge speaks normatively in ascribing meaning to a 
statute or constitutional provision, her statement will expressly or implicitly 
allude to some vision or theory of the good. The judge’s statement will 
consequently be as valid as its supporting vision or theory of the good. The 
statement will then only be valid as a proposition of law when a given 
society recognizes that vision or theory as a source of law. Finally, when a 
judge makes an autocratic statement that the relevant statutory or 
constitutional provision means X, she offers no external verification criteria 
for that statement. All she says, expressly or implicitly, is that she wants the 
provision to mean X. The judge’s will thus becomes the only criterion for 
validating her statement about the provision’s meaning. Consequently, the 
statement will only be valid as a proposition of law in a society that 
recognizes the judge’s will as a source of law.217 
These distinctions run parallel to the lines drawn by scholarly debates 
about constitutional and statutory interpretations. Academics and 
academically minded judges participating in those debates have made 
multiple claims concerning the methods for ascertaining the meanings of 
statutory and constitutional provisions. These claims often conflict with 
each other. They have been popularized as textualism,218 intentionalism,219 
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originalism,220 purposivism,221 pragmatism,222 realism,223 critical legal 
theories,224 and Dworkinianism.225 Some of these claims purport to describe 
actual judicial practices.226 Other claims are normative: they single out and 
recommend interpretive methodologies based on the methodologies’ 
virtues.227 
Textualism, intentionalism, originalism and, for the most part, 
purposivism as well, are all methods for ascertaining the true meanings of 
statutes and constitutional provisions.228 These methodologies consequently 
fall into my “factual” category.229 Pragmatism and realism, in turn, are 
theories that express deep skepticism about judges’ ability and need to 
ascertain the true meanings of statutes and constitutional provisions.230 
Extreme versions of pragmatism and realism that inform critical legal 
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theories’ claim, in addition, that there is no such thing as a true statutory or 
constitutional meaning.231 Critical theories also underscore the prevalence 
of power over reason in courts’ decisions that ascribe meanings to statutes 
and constitutions.232 Under my taxonomy, these theories place courts’ 
decisions about propositions of law in the “autocratic” category.  
Dworkinianism is a theory named after its inventor, Professor Ronald 
Dworkin.233 This theory is situated between factualism and autocracy. On 
the theoretical side, Dworkinianism maintains that the methodology 
identified here as factual only works in easy cases featuring statutory and 
constitutional provisions that have a plain meaning.234 All other cases, 
identified as “hard,” require a different methodology that relies on a moral 
understanding of the legal text.235 This methodology requires the judge to 
view settled law as a moral practice, to identify general moral principles that 
best explain that practice, and then read those principles into ambiguous 
statutes and constitutional provisions (as well as into the unclear common-
law doctrines) in a way that maintains coherence across the legal system as 
a whole.236 Dworkinianism, as applied to hard cases, squarely falls into the 
category identified above as “normative.” 
2. Epistemology at Work 
Epistemology does not have much to contribute to normative discussions 
as to what law ought to be. Epistemology focuses upon knowledge of facts 
and is far removed from conversations about moral and political desiderata. 
For the same reason, epistemology cannot advance the understanding of 
autocratic judiciary and its fact-free statements about the meanings of legal 
rules. From an epistemological standpoint, propositions identifying the 
meaning of a legal rule can only be justified when they rely on reason rather 
than fiat. Social forces, biases, and imbalances of power that allow judges 
to make autocratic decisions or act as “politicians in robes” are important 
phenomena that merit serious investigation. Disciplines capable of guiding 
such investigations include political theory, sociology, and social 
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psychology. Epistemology is not one of those disciplines: it only comes into 
play when decision-makers try to ascertain the true facts rather than form 
opinions on matters of right and wrong. Yet, because true facts oftentimes 
matter a lot, epistemology matters a lot as well. 
Factual claims about the meaning of a legal rule, are therefore a proper 
subject for epistemological inquiry. When a judge writes in her decision that 
the meaning of a statutory or constitutional provision is X as a matter of fact, 
this proposition must be epistemically justified. Failure to provide such 
justification would make the proposition unreasoned and hence autocratic, 
rather than factual. To justify a decision that ascribes factual meaning X to 
a legal rule, the judge must rely on empirical facts, which include the rule’s 
language, purpose, and history, and on the background information about 
linguistic usage and conventions. These facts must indicate that the rule 
actually says X, as opposed to something else. Preferably, these facts should 
contain enough cues that are counterfactually sensitive to X. To satisfy this 
requirement, it would not be enough for those cues to indicate that X is a 
plausible meaning of the rule. Those cues also should not show up in any 
hypothetical scenario in which the rule has a meaning different from X. As 
a second choice, the judge must search for and find enough cues that satisfy 
a less stringent standard, describable as relative plausibility or best 
explanation.237 Under this more realistic standard, the judge would be able 
to determine that the rule actually says X if the cues supporting this 
understanding of the rule continue to support it under every plausible 
assumption about the facts that are still unknown. Put differently, cues that 
identify X as the rule’s meaning need to do so in all hypothetical scenarios 
that come to mind except those that are far removed from the case at bar. 
By using such cues, the judge will determine the factually correct meaning 
of the rule with a high degree of probability.238 
When such factual decisions are made by tribunals consisting of several 
judges, the epistemology of disagreement becomes relevant as well. For 
reasons I already provided, judges serving in multimember courts should be 
considered epistemic peers, whose opinions—including dissents—should 
always play a role in the final decision.239 Hence, when a minority of the 
Supreme Court Justices disagree with the majority about the factual 
meaning of a particular statute or constitutional provision, this disagreement 
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should not be buried under the weight of the ensuing precedent. Instead, it 
should reduce the precedent’s weight and make it open to future revision. 
The extent to which the Court’s precedent should be open to such revisions 
will depend on the number of dissenters. With four dissenting Justices, the 
precedent should be reassessed when the first opportunity to reexamine it 
presents itself. When the number of dissenters goes down to three, two, and 
one, the precedent becomes weightier, and the Court should justifiably feel 
more reluctant to revise it. This principle should apply to precedents 
delivered by state supreme courts as well. 
3. Illustrations 
The following illustrations will clarify how this proposal will work. The 
first of these illustrations is a classic Supreme Court decision on statutory 
interpretation, West Virginia University Hospitals v. Casey.240 My second 
illustration features the Supreme Court’s decision Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts241 that ascribed meaning to the Sixth Amendment’s word 
“witness.”242 Both decisions were delivered by the Court’s majority that 
overrode the opinions of dissenting Justices.243 
In West Virginia University Hospitals v. Casey,244 the Supreme Court 
had to determine the scope of the Civil Rights Act (CRA) provision that 
authorized courts to award “a reasonable attorney’s fee” to a plaintiff who 
successfully prosecuted a civil rights suit.245 Specifically, the Court had to 
decide whether the “attorney’s fee” that courts could shift to the losing 
defendant included the plaintiff’s expenditures on experts who helped her 
attorney prepare and prosecute the suit.246 This question arose in connection 
with a Medicaid reimbursement suit won by West Virginia University 
Hospitals.247 The suit’s preparation and prosecution was assisted by an 
accounting firm and three doctors specializing in hospital finance.248 These 
experts collectively received over $100,000 for their services.249  
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The Court answered the question in the negative in a 6-3 decision.250 
Justice Scalia delivered the majority opinion,251 which relied primarily on 
the statutory text and its usage.252 First and foremost, Justice Scalia observed 
that, alongside the CRA, Congress has enacted numerous other statutes with 
fee-shifting provisions that explicitly encompass expenditures on experts 
and consultants.253 Moreover, in its reference to general testimonial 
services, the CRA limited witnesses’ compensation to a daily attendance fee 
in the amount of $30.254 Additionally, when the CRA’s fee-shifting 
provision was enacted, “neither statutory nor judicial usage regarded the 
phrase ‘attorney’s fees’ as embracing fees for experts’ services.”255 These 
three factors strongly indicated that the CRA’s fee-shifting provision did 
not cover the plaintiff’s expenditures on experts.256 Because Congress was 
well aware of those expenses and acted on multiple occasions to 
affirmatively authorize courts to shift them to the losing defendant, the 
proposition that it simply forgot to include a similar authorization in the 
CRA or, conversely, granted it by allowing courts to award plaintiffs 
“attorney’s fees” flatly contradicted statutory texts.257 
The dissenting Justices disagreed with this analysis because it paid no 
regard to the congressional intent.258 By enacting the CRA’s fee-shifting 
provision, Congress intended to incentivize the filing and prosecution of 
public interest suits.259 When prospective plaintiffs anticipate recovering no 
reimbursement for their expenditures on experts, many of them might prefer 
not to sue and let civil rights’ violators go scot free. This consequence 
undercuts the CRA’s social purpose and therefore runs against Congress’s 
intent.260 According to the dissenting Justices, Congress simply forgot to 
specify the expression “attorney’s fee” as including the plaintiff attorneys’ 
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258. Id. at 102 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 115 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
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260. See id. at 102–03 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Hidle v. Geneva County Bd. of Ed., 681 
F. Supp. 752, 758–59 (M.D. Ala. 1988)). See also Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Empowering 
Individual Plaintiffs, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1319, 1330–35 (2017) (identifying structural disparities in 
litigation costs between individual plaintiffs and institutional defendants and showing that plaintiffs 
facing such disparities have no rational incentive to sue). 











expenses on experts and consultants;261 and it is also possible that 
“attorney’s fee” was actually meant to include those expenses as well.262 
Aptly identified by Professor John Manning as “intent skeptic,”263 
Justice Scalia dismissed this argument rather cavalierly by saying that “the 
purpose of a statute includes not only what it sets out to change, but also 
what it resolves to leave alone.”264 This response begs the question because 
whether Congress actually resolved to leave expert expenses alone or left 
them alone inadvertently was the very issue that the Court had to decide. 
Another issue on which the Court had to rule was whether Congress had 
indeed left expert expenses alone instead of incorporating them in 
“attorney’s fees.” Arguably, therefore, Justice Marshall made a valid point 
when he wrote that the Court’s majority “uses the implements of literalism 
to wound, rather than to minister to, congressional intent in this case.”265 
From an epistemological perspective, none of these analyses could claim 
to have identified the meaning of the CRA’s fee-shifting provision with 
absolute certainty. The majority’s understanding that “attorney’s fees” do 
not include expenses on experts could be unquestionably correct if the 
inclusion and the inadvertent-omission scenarios, favored by the dissenting 
Justices, had a zero probability to be correct. This, however, was not the 
case. By the same token, the dissent’s opinion that one of its 
interpretations—inclusion or inadvertent omission—is unquestionably 
correct could only hold if the majority’s exclusion scenario had a zero 
probability to be correct. This zero-probability assumption was patently 
false as well. The exclusion, the inclusion, and the inadvertent-omission 
scenarios were all in the realm of the probable. Each of those scenarios had 
a non-negligible probability of being true. The Justices consequently had no 
choice but to base their interpretation of “attorney’s fees” on the most 
probable scenario. Arguably, this is also what they actually did 
notwithstanding their rhetoric of certainty.266 
                                                      
261. See WVUH, 499 U.S. at 115 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[W]e do the country a disservice when 
we needlessly ignore persuasive evidence of Congress’ actual purpose and require it . . . to restate its 
purpose in more precise English whenever its work product suffers from an omission or inadvertent 
error.”).  
262. See id. at 107–08 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that attorneys nowadays need expert 
help to effectively represent clients). 
263. See John F. Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1911, 1932–33 
(2015) (discussing Justice Scalia’s refusal to treat Congress’s intent as a benchmark for statutory 
interpretation). 
264. WVUH, 499 U.S. at 98 (citing Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987)). 
265. Id. at 102 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
266. The Justices’ disagreement can also be understood as a clash between strict textualism and 
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Epistemological principles also require that the Court’s decision account 
for its members’ disagreement about relevant probabilities. Assume that six 
Justices out of nine had decided, as they did in the WVUH case, that the 
meaning of “attorney’s fees” as excluding expert expenses has the highest 
probability of being correct. This decision surely deserves to carry the day 
because it attracted a sizable majority of the Justices. But should it preclude 
future revisions, given that the remaining three Justices have chosen to 
ascribe the highest probability to a much broader interpretation of 
“attorney’s fees”? I believe it should not. The dissent voiced by the 
majority’s epistemic peers, who make one-third of the Court, did not win, 
but it also did not lose its epistemic value.267 As I explained earlier in this 
Article, this epistemic value is best conceptualized as second-order evidence 
that goes to the reliability of the majority’s decision.268 This evidence should 
reduce the decision’s epistemic strength in proportion with the number of 
dissenters. The majority’s decision consequently becomes less reliable than 
it would have been had it faced fewer dissenters or no dissenters at all. 
Decisions supported by a majority of five, or even six, Justices out of nine 
therefore should remain open to reconsideration as a precedent.269 
Consider now the Melendez-Diaz decision,270 in which a majority of five 
Justices ruled that state laws cannot constitutionally allow the prosecution 
in a criminal case to use a forensic expert’s “certificate of analysis” as 
evidence of drug identification unless the expert testifies in court and makes 
                                                      
suppresses information about the legislature’s intent and unrestricted purposivism overrides statutory 
text. Instead of categorically preferring text over intent, or vice versa, courts should integrate both types 
of information in a decision that determines the most probable meaning of the underlying statutory or 
constitutional provision. This integrative approach strikes me as the best approximation of what courts 
actually do, but whether my intuition is correct is a big question that deserves a separate article-length 
treatment. Cf. William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 
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meaning of a legal rule when the rule seems clear); Abbe R. Gluck, Congress, Statutory Interpretation, 
and the Failure of Formalism: The CBO Canon and Other Ways That Courts Can Improve on What 
They Are Already Trying to Do, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 177 (2017) (criticizing formalist rules of statutory 
interpretation and arguing that courts should ascertain the meanings of federal statutes by accounting for 
the realities of the legislative process and congressional drafting practices). 
267. Tellingly, the dissent in the WVUH case may well have gotten it right. Congress’s enactment 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 113, Pub. L. No. 102–166, indicates that the inadvertent-omission 
scenario was correct. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c) (“In awarding an attorney’s fee under subsection (b) of 
this section in any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section 1981 or 1981(a) of this title, 
the court, in its discretion, may include expert fees as part of the attorney’s fee.”); Landgraf v. USI Film 
Products, 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994) (acknowledging that the Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 113, codified 
as 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c), responded to the WVUH decision). 
268. See supra notes 11, 32–33 and accompanying text. 
269. Whether such reconsideration should result in overruling the precedent is a question of policy 
that cannot be resolved on epistemological grounds. See infra notes 297–303 and accompanying text. 
270. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 











herself available for cross-examination by the defendant’s attorney.271 This 
ruling relied on the Sixth Amendment that entitles a criminal defendant “to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him.”272 According to this ruling, 
an expert who produces a certificate of analysis identifying a substance 
seized from the defendant as a controlled drug counts as a “witness” for 
purposes of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.273 Justice Scalia, 
joined by Justices Stevens, Thomas, Souter, and Ginsburg, reasoned that 
this ruling squarely aligns with the Framers’ intent.274 Part of this decision 
drew upon Justice Scalia’s historical analysis of the Confrontation Clause 
in Crawford v. Washington.275 This analysis revealed that the Framers 
intended the Clause to forestall the abhorrent practice of trial by ex parte 
affidavits, which took place in the British treason trials throughout the 
sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries.276 As part of that practice, the 
government enlisted informants and other producers of information 
incriminating the defendant—usually, a persona non grata—who would 
sign a sworn affidavit or give the government another formal statement in 
the defendant’s absence.277 The government would subsequently adduce the 
affidavit or statement into evidence while taking advantage of the 
defendant’s inability to confront and question his accuser.278 The Framers 
formulated the Confrontation Clause in order to deny the government this 
one-sided power over the flow of information into the courtroom.279 
Based on this analysis, Justice Scalia decided that experts generating 
forensic documentation that the government subsequently uses as 
inculpatory evidence are no different from the old-day ex parte declarants 
whose word sent defendants to jail or to gallows.280 Historical evidence, 
however, could not justify this holding. Because forensic experts did not 
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276. Id. at 42–50, 62. 
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testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not. The 
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exist at the time of the old British treason trials, the hypothesis that the 
Framers wanted to preclude the government from using their certificates as 
evidence against the accused was factually false. This simple point was 
made by Justice Kennedy, who wrote the dissenting opinion joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and Alito.281 For Justice Kennedy, the 
word “witnesses” that the Framers used in the Confrontation Clause referred 
to conventional witnesses, rather than to “laboratory analysts who perform 
scientific tests.”282  
The dissent was also right in suggesting that the majority’s holding could 
not be justified by logic. Unlike conventional witnesses, who hold a lot of 
private information that cannot be verified, forensic experts use scientific 
methodologies that open their evidence to scrutiny.283 Anything they say or 
write can be examined and effectively challenged by other experts.284 
Forensic experts also differ from conventional witnesses motivationally. 
Each of those experts “is equally remote from the scene, has no personal 
stake in the outcome, does not even know the accused, and is concerned 
only with the performance of his or her role in conducting the test.”285 
These factors reduce the majority’s probability of being factually correct 
about the meaning of “witnesses.” This probability, however, still remains 
high on account of Justice Scalia’s general historical observations. As he 
explained in both Melendez-Diaz and the Crawford decision, the gist of the 
Confrontation Clause is mistrust of the government, not mistrust of the 
evidence.286 For that reason, “the paradigmatic [British treason] case 
identifies the core of the right to confrontation, not its limits.”287 Forensic 
experts are surely not conventional witnesses, but malevolent government 
officers can fabricate forensic evidence as well.288 
From an epistemological point of view, this 5–4 decision makes 
Melendez-Diaz a weak precedent. Five Justices out of nine have decided 
that the Sixth Amendment’s word “witnesses” includes forensic experts 
who submit their reports to the government. The remaining four Justices 
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have opined that this word does not refer to forensic experts. Both coalitions 
made factual claims about the meaning of a recurrent legal term and the 
Framers’ intent. Those claims could be simultaneously false, but not 
simultaneously correct. One of the claims was therefore necessarily false, 
but both of them still had a non-negligible probability of being true. 
Critically, the four-Justice minority opinion substantially reduced the 
reliability of the Court’s decision. 
Under these epistemic conditions, the majority’s interpretation of the 
word “witnesses” calls for reexamination at the earliest occasion. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Supreme Court has already revisited 
Melendez-Diaz twice. In its 2011 decision, Bullcoming v. New Mexico,289 
the Court reconfirmed Melendez-Diaz by a new five-Justice majority.290 In 
2012, the Court decided Williams v. Illinois,291 a complex decision that 
weakened the precedential force of the Melendez-Diaz ruling.292 
B. Doctrine 
Whether the precedent doctrine evolving in the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence aligns with the epistemology of disagreement is hard to tell. 
While delivering the Court’s decision in Payne v. Tennessee,293 Chief 
Justice Rehnquist wrote that the general principles governing judicial 
adherence to precedent allow overturning prior rulings “decided by the 
narrowest of margins, over spirited dissents challenging the basic 
underpinnings of those decisions.”294 The Chief Justice also observed that 
the Court’s application of these principles “has during the past 20 Terms 
overruled in whole or in part 33 of its previous constitutional decisions.”295 
Based on the “narrow margin and spirited dissent” criterion, the Chief 
Justice controversially decided to overturn the Court’s previous precedents 
that blocked the introduction of victim impact statements in capital cases.296  
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The “narrow margin and spirited dissent” criterion for overturning 
precedent has been harshly criticized,297 and its doctrinal status is yet to be 
determined.298 A recent study of precedents carried out by Professor Randy 
Kozel299 identifies two jurisprudential strands that pull the doctrine in 
different directions. On the one hand, a “major question in defining the 
strength of precedent is whether a decision’s unsound reasoning and flawed 
result are themselves sufficient to warrant its overruling.”300 Furthermore, 
precedents also play an important economic role in our legal system. By 
applying a discrete court ruling to a question of law in multiple cases, this 
system generates substantial economies of scale. For that reason, judicial 
time and effort that go into a fact-based revision of a broadly applicable 
precedent will virtually always pay off. This investment may be costly, but 
                                                      
enshrine power [instead of reason] as the governing principle of this Court is the notion that an important 
constitutional decision with plainly inadequate rational support must be left in place for the sole reason 
that it once attracted five votes.”). 
297. The strongest criticism came from Justice Thurgood Marshall:  
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the legal system will spread its cost across many cases.301 On the other hand, 
adherence to precedent protects stability and people’s expectations. From 
that perspective, the whole point of a precedent is to stand despite being 
wrong.302  
Choosing between the settled and the right is not easy303 and 
epistemology offers no guidance on how to make such tradeoffs. 
Epistemology, however, both can and should play a pivotal role in 
identifying the very need to reconsider a precedent. When a precedent 
alludes to the factual correctness of the meaning it ascribes to a legal rule, 
this allusion becomes a proper subject of the epistemological inquiry. This 
inquiry must utilize all epistemic indicators of the truth. Disagreement 
among members of the same court as to what the legal rule actually means 
is among those indicators. 
CONCLUSION 
Mahatma Gandhi famously observed that “[h]onest disagreement is 
often a good sign of progress.”304 Disagreements may indeed improve 
people’s decisions, but this can only happen when people give their 
dissenters the epistemic credit they deserve instead of simply “agreeing to 
disagree.” When a person considers all available information, makes a 
factual finding, and then hears from an equally informed and honest 
individual that, according to her judgment, the facts are different, the person 
will do well to scale down his level of confidence in the finding. From an 
epistemological standpoint, the person cannot rationally remain as confident 
about that finding as he initially was. Our legal system disregards this 
epistemological mandate when it validates as unanimous jury verdicts that 
show no alignment between reasons and decisions, when it authorizes 
appellate courts to determine by a simple majority that a violation of the 
accused’s constitutional trial right was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and when it accords the status of an unreservedly binding precedent to a 5–
4 decision of the United States Supreme Court. By fixing these distortions, 
our system will improve its functioning across multiple areas of the law. 
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When truth is important and the cost of error is high, law and epistemology 
should work in tandem. 
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